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Article

Antitrust and the Robo-Seller:
Competition in the Time of Algorithms
†

Salil K. Mehra

INTRODUCTION
Disruptive innovation can turn users into newly-minted
economists. Consider the controversial practice of “surge pric1
ing” enabled by the ride-sharing service Uber. Confronted on
occasions such as New Year’s Eve by prices six to seven times
as much as normal, users tend to ask for an explanation. On
the one hand, surge pricing resembles basic market economics—many people want a ride, market demand pushes the price
up, and those higher prices attract more drivers until the price
2
falls to a new level. But as Uber’s own marketing recognizes,
this is a market whose price signals act within a proprietary
† Professor of Law, Temple University, James E. Beasley School of Law.
smehra@temple.edu. The author wishes to thank Greg Mandel, Jeff Vagle,
Polk Wagner, Harwell Wells, and Chris Yoo for their comments, as well as
participants at workshops and conferences at the University of St. Gallen,
Bournemouth University and the University of Pennsylvania. Thanks also to
Dylan Taylor for research assistance and Sarah Mehra for editing help. Copyright © 2016 by Salil K. Mehra.
1. See Eric Posner, Why Uber Will—and Should—Be Regulated, SLATE
(Jan. 5, 2015, 2:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_
from_chicago/2015/01/uber_surge_pricing_federal_regulation_over_taxis_and_
car_ride_services.single.html (endorsing arguments for regulation of surge
pricing, Uber’s term for raising prices at times of higher demand); Ilya Somin,
Surge Pricing and Political Ignorance, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/12/31/surge-pricing-and-political-ignorance (opposing regulation, but
fearing that “without at least a basic understanding of economics, consumers
won’t realize that surge pricing increases the quantity and quality of available
goods”); see also Yves Faguy, The Uber Cartel, CBA NATIONAL (Jan. 5, 2015),
http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Blog/January-2015/The-Uber-cartel.aspx
(discussing surge pricing and noting the possible relevance of Canadian competition law).
2. See Jacob Saulwick, Is Cab App Just an Uber Cartel?, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/business/is-cab-app
-just-an-uber-cartel-20150108-12ktd5.
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black box: “Dynamic pricing algorithmically increases prices to
encourage more drivers to come onto the platform and increase
3
supply.” As Uber’s CEO has stated: “[W]e are not setting the
price, the market is setting the price. . . . [W]e have algorithms
4
to determine what that market is.” By this account, the market
is both an independent force of nature that determines price,
but also paradoxically a result constructed at least in part by a
5
proprietary algorithm.
Some have observed that the drivers are independent contractors, who “could in theory” compete against each other, but
who instead have agreed to have their prices coordinated and
set by the algorithm of a company that gets a twenty percent
6
slice of the fare. Whether this is paradigm-shifting, disruptive
technology or a harmful, twenty-first-century, techno-cartel depends in part on the workings of that algorithm. Competition
law does not yet have a good sense of how to appraise this situation; how to begin this inquiry is the focus of this Article.
How will antitrust law work when decisions are no longer
made by humans but instead by machines? Antitrust’s archetypal villains—price-fixing bosses in a smoke-filled room—may
7
be coming to the end of their road. The increasing power of
computers has become a game changer. Their rising power,
plus the growing ubiquity of the Internet, and increasingly sophisticated data-mining techniques have driven a rapid shift of
pricing decisions away from human-decision makers in favor of
algorithms—defined as step-by-step procedures for solving

3. Id. (emphasis added); see also Matt Stoller, How Uber Creates an Algorithmic Monopoly To Extract Rents, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/04/matt-stoller-how-uber-creates-an
-algorithmic-monopoly.html.
4. Stoller, supra note 3 (“[Uber’s] algorithm is not regulated nor is it
transparent, so neither the buyer nor the seller has any credible information.
This isn’t a market, it’s a monopoly. It’s a special type of monopoly, an algorithmic monopoly. It may mimic market-style pricing, or it may not. That’s up
to Uber.”).
5. Id.
6. Saulwick, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Transcript of Record of Defendant’s Testimony vol. 12, at
4889, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 6) (testimony
of Elbert H. Gary) (describing the famous “Gary dinners,” a series of social
events and meetings early in the 20th century, convened to encourage executives of rival steelmakers to tell each other “frankly and freely what they were
doing, how much business they were doing, what prices they were charging, . . . and . . . all information concerning their business” in order to stabilize
prices).
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8

problems, especially by a computer. Increasingly the software
programs that apply these algorithms, functioning as “robo9
sellers,” can make pricing decisions autonomously.
“Can robo-sellers really raise prices?,” a skeptical reader
might wonder. The simple answer: they already have done so.
In 2011, one could find a classic, twenty-year-old, developmental biology textbook on fruit flies available on Amazon for the
10
astonishing price of $23.7 million. That particular “market
price” was set through the interaction of two different sellers’
programmed algorithms. The first algorithm automatically set
the price of the first book for 1.27059 times the price of the second book—which belonged to the other seller in the market11
place. The second algorithm automatically set the price of the
12
second book at 0.9983 times the price of the first book. Because the two equations x = 1.27059 * y and y = 0.9983 * x cannot be reconciled for positive numbers, the result was an upward spiral in which each algorithm’s price hike was
subsequently responded to by a price hike from the other, and
13
vice versa. From April 8 to 18, 2011, the offer prices of the two
14
books rose in tandem into the millions of dollars.

8. Algorithm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/algorithm (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
9. See, e.g., John Bible, The Science of Retail: How To Counterbalance
Instinct with Data-Driven Insight, ORACLE RETAIL (2014), http://www.oracle
.com/us/industries/retail/view-point-science-fashion-br-2225302.pdf
(stating
that traditional “retailers are still in the early stages of using their data in
truly scientific ways . . . to turn rich troves of data into dollars by better demand measurement and management” by “explor[ing] every facet of price
elasticity” and adding that “[e]ven with new products that have no history, the
algorithms can examine the performance of similar products to discover the
patterns needed to support initial pricing decisions and to chart a likely model
for lifecycle pricing”); Natalie Burg, Your Company Can See the Future with
Predictive Analytics, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 9:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/sungardas/2014/03/26/your-company-can-see-the-future-with-predictiveanalytics-2 (stating that “predictive analytics utilizes ‘a variety of statistical,
modeling, data mining, and machine learning techniques to study recent and
historical data, thereby allowing analysts to make predictions about the future’” and “can be used to automatically vary pricing over time based on purchasing trends”).
10. See CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME
TO RULE OUR WORLD 1 (2012).
11. See John D. Sutter, Amazon Seller Lists Book at $23,698,655.93—Plus
Shipping, CNN (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/04/25/
amazon.price.algorithm/index.htm.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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The fruit-fly textbook example appears to have been the
product of mistake rather than any conscious anticompetitive
15
intent. By contrast, suspicions about Uber’s algorithm go to
whether it has been designed to exploit consumers—such concerns echo calls in other areas for “algorithmic neutrality” to
16
prevent economically or socially harmful distortions. Given
the textbook example, whether or not their creators intend,
robo-sellers can combine algorithmic pricing with autonomous
decisionmaking to charge consumers higher prices.
Algorithmic pricing continues to grow hand-in-hand with
the increasing ability of autonomously operating softwarebased agents. Pablo Picasso believed that the computers of his
17
era were “useless” since “[t]hey c[ould] only give you answers.”
But times have changed; since then, computers with machinelearning capabilities have bested humans at chess and “Jeop18
19
ardy!” —and, thanks to Google, safe driving. Their increasing
ability and autonomy makes them an essential, inescapable
presence in twenty-first-century business.
Computers, “big data,” and algorithmic processes have al20
21
tered how people learn and love —and, of course, how we
15. As one expert on machine learning noted, “[t]he expansion of API [applications programming interfaces—specifications detailing how and encouraging one program to interact with another] usage in marketplaces means: . . .
[a]ny PhD with an idea can create a startup to add value to a marketplace . . .
[and] [a]ny idiot with a questionable algorithm can screw things up for everyone.” Marshall Kirkpatrick, When Bots Go Mad, READWRITE (Feb. 25, 2012),
http://readwrite.com/2012/02/25/when_bots_go_mad.
16. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing Google and
the claimed need for “algorithmic neutrality” in search algorithms).
17. William Fifield, Pablo Picasso—A Composite Interview, 32 PARIS REV.
37, 62 (1964).
18. See David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An Overview of the
DeepQA Project, AI MAGAZINE (Fall 2010), http://www.aaai.org/Magazine/
Watson/Watson.php.
19. See The Self-Driving Car Logs More Miles on New Wheels, GOOGLE
OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 7, 2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.hu/2012/08/the-selfdriving-car-logs-more-miles-on.html. But see Fatality Facts, INS. INST. FOR
HIGHWAY SAFETY, http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/
fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (reporting
10.8 deaths per 100,000 people and 1.14 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles
traveled in the United States due to accidents in 2012); FARS Encyclopedia,
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/
index.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (recording 29,867 fatal crashes for human drivers in 2011).
20. See James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology To Enhance Access to
Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241, 255–56 (noting that independent institutions such as the Khan Academy have begun offering free online courses in
science and technology); Maciej H. Kotowski et al., Audits As Signals, 81 U.
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shop. Sellers use dynamic-pricing algorithms to gauge supply
and demand and set prices not only for books and air tickets
online, but increasingly, for consumer electronics, groceries,
22
and other tangible goods in brick-and-mortar stores. An industry has rapidly sprung up to provide software-embedded
mathematical models that digest mass-collected data to moni23
tor market conditions and make pricing decisions.
This Article offers the first descriptive and normative
study of this change and its critically important implications
24
for antitrust law. This Article has two goals: First, it provides
a descriptive picture of the sea change in commerce that is taking place due to the spread of algorithm-driven dynamic pricing. Second, using that snapshot as a base, this Article strives
to identify and analyze the broader normative consequences for
consumer welfare and antitrust law. To be sure, such an effort
to describe and predict the course of a quickly evolving business
25
world must be preliminary at best. But it must be examined,
as the change entailed has become too significant and wide26
ranging to avoid discussion.
CHI. L. REV. 179, 200 (2014) (noting universities’ use of massive open online
courses (MOOCs)).
21. See AMY WEBB, DATA, A LOVE STORY: HOW I GAMED ONLINE DATING
TO MEET MY MATCH 71–84 (2013) (reviewing data-driven, algorithmic, dating
sites).
22. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Shopper Alert: Price May Drop for You
Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/
business/supermarkets-try-customizing-prices-for-shoppers.html;
Tucker
Cummings, Everything You Need To Know About Dynamic Pricing, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Saving
-Money/2013/1104/Everything-you-need-to-know-about-dynamic-pricing (“Best
Buy is . . . committed to a dynamic pricing strategy . . . .”).
23. See infra Part I.
24. This Article uses “antitrust law” and the broader, but similar, “competition law” interchangeably.
25. Indeed, this problem has long been recognized to be inherent in any
study of a fast-moving legal issue. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
26. Some commentators express concern about antitrust enforcement in
fast-moving digital industries on the grounds that the probability and costs of
errors may be high. See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and
the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 178, 213–44 (2011) (arguing for cautious application of
antitrust against Google since a “false positive” might chill “innovation and
competition”). Others point out that “the features that distinguish” such markets from “conventional” industries “do not all weigh in favor of biasing policy
toward underenforcement, the social costs of which could be at least as high as
those of overenforcement.” Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and
Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1663, 1667–68
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This Article sets forth this tale and study in four parts.
Part I paints the overall landscape. It situates the in-progress
transformation of sellers, buyers, and price-setting within a
broader social context in which algorithm-laded software is
playing bigger and more important roles. Part I describes how
the rise of the era of algorithms has already changed certain
industries’ behavior as well as consumer expectations. It then
explains how as this era blossoms, it is morphing sellers into
robo-sellers—producing a faster, broader, more-networked and
increasingly non-human world-spanning bazaar.
Part II addresses a key risk posed by the robo-seller. The
paradigmatic harm of collusion among competitors may grow
and become more threatening. Perhaps worse still, robo-sellers
may increase the risk that, in some cases, real-world
oligopolists will operationalize their individual theoretical incentives to achieve Nash equilibrium prices above the competitive level, thereby harming consumers. The Sherman Act contains a gap in its coverage under which oligopolists that can
achieve price coordination interdependently, without communication or facilitating practices, generally escape antitrust en27
forcement, even when their actions yield supracompetitive
pricing that harms consumers. Antitrust law has famously
struggled with this issue for half a century—and robo-sellers
will likely make this gap even more problematic. Classic models of oligopoly have identified key features that make a cartel
hard to sustain, and current antitrust enforcement attempts to
harness some of these features in order to preemptively undercut cartel formation. Time lags between defection from a cartel
and its discovery make that defection more profitable and undermine collusion. Noise, errors, and complexity make “accidental,” but still fatal, defection from a cartel more likely. Finally, human sellers have hyperbolic discount rates that make
sellers prefer to cheat on their partners in collusion even while
they sacrifice future cartel profits. Robo-sellers will “solve”
some of these issues for oligopolists, making higher prices that
injure consumers more likely.
(2013); see also Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free
Goods: Implications for Antirust Enforcement (N.Y.U., Working Paper No. 1444, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2529425 (rejecting “the position . . . that free goods” commonly found in the digital ecosystem “should not come under antitrust scrutiny”).
27 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV.
655, 671 (1962).
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Part III broadens the perspective to include the impact of
robo-selling on monopolists and more overt cartel behavior. In
particular, it addresses the implications of the robo-seller on
cases in which price coordination requires communication or
facilitating practices in order for firms to come to an anticompetitive “agreement.” In these cases, usually analyzed as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the Nash equilibrium is to “cheat”
on the cartel, an agreement is required to avoid the inferior
(from the price-fixers’ perspective) outcome. Under standard
models of oligopoly, even where sellers have individual incentives to price supracompetitively, they can do better by achieving an agreement, tacitly or overtly; in some cases, competing
firms can only achieve supracompetitive pricing in this way. In
considering how antitrust law should respond, Part III identifies a key creature that is relatively unexamined due to its
longstanding ubiquity, until now, in antitrust law: the human
seller. Longstanding debates in antitrust focus on the role of in28
tent in finding a Section 2 offense involving monopoly, enforcers’ goal of sowing fear and distrust among potential Section 1
29
price-fixing violators, and the need for agreement in proving a
30
Section 1 price-fixing offense. Part III then explains how the
shift from human price-setting to robo-sellers requires a rethink of competition law. Specifically, antitrust relies on anthropomorphic concepts of intent, fear, distrust, and agreement
with which it will prove hard to categorize or incentivize the
robo-seller. Competition law will have to reconsider its embedded assumption of personhood in those it seeks to punish and
deter.
Part IV discusses possible solutions. First, it focuses on key
systemic issues that will complicate antitrust’s rendezvous with
the robo-seller. It explores two important normative consequences. First, it asks how likely it is that robo-sellers could be
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1695 (2013).
30. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
40 (1976) (describing the difficulty of deterring “tacit collusion” when it does
“not involve explicit, detectable acts of agreement or communication”); Louis
Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99
CAL. L. REV. 683 (2011); William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concerted Action, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 173 (2012); Turner, supra note 27 (arguing
that oligopolists who anticipate “the probable reactions of competitors in setting their basic prices, without more in the way of ‘agreement’ than is found in
‘conscious parallelism,’ should not be held unlawful conspirators under the
Sherman Act”).
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successfully regulated. The complexity of the algorithms involved and their interaction makes this potentially a daunting
regulatory challenge. Additionally, it warns of underestimating
the benefits of the robo-seller. Even if, as this Article explains,
both independent Nash equilibrium coordinated pricing and
collusion become more likely with robo-sellers, they may nonetheless be so efficient such that the benefits of robo-selling outweigh its harms. In more formal terms, using algorithms, software, and big data to do key business functions such as market
intelligence, information gathering, strategic management, and
sales may reduce marginal cost even while they make price coordination—and pricing to consumers above marginal cost—
31
more likely. Part IV then turns to address several possible solutions, including banning robo-sellers, subjecting them to traditional antitrust processes under the rule of reason, or seeking
antitrust’s potential evolution within a wider context of how
law will deal with autonomous agents more broadly. Specifically, the more general argument that the law should recognize
that autonomous software agents are evolving beyond their
original role as the mere tools of their principals is not an easy
fit for antitrust. The evolving, shifting treatment has been justified deontologically based on autonomous agents’ incipient
32
ability to reason. Joining such a solution is not an easy move
for antitrust, which by contrast is relentlessly instrumental in
its focus; for example, consumer welfare and the fear of false
33
positives have become articles of faith in antitrust. The best,
but imperfect, solution may be to incorporate an evolving approach to robo-sellers as a reasonable expansion of the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) ongoing regulatory program targeting the competition and consumer protection aspects of pri31. There are conflicting viewpoints on how to treat such a circumstance.
Some commentators view any welfare transfer from consumers to producers as
in conflict with antitrust law’s original intent and continuing goal, regardless
of any offsetting, overall, social welfare benefits. See Robert H. Lande, Proving
the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed To Protect Consumers (Not Just
To Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 963 (1999) (discussing the
“wealth transfer thesis”).
32. See SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 171–72 (2011) (suggesting that Locke’s definition of “person” is consistent with ascribing legal personhood and moral responsibility to artificial agents).
33. Borrowed from medicine and the sciences, the term “false positives”
refers to erroneous punishment of efficiency-enhancing conduct. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004).
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vacy. Looking further into the future, regulators may need to
develop the ability to test and probe the effects of algorithmic
sales on consumers; agencies may need to conduct their own
“algorithmic enforcement.” Significant regulatory efficiencies
may stem from the overlap between the technologies involved
and the concerns for consumers that they raise.
I. THE AGE OF THE ALGORITHM
Our digital age relies on the increasing power and influence of computers, interconnection, especially via the Internet,
and massive collection and analysis of data. Technological progress has made our computing devices speedier, smaller, less
expensive, and, increasingly, mobile. Increasingly, it has also
put such computing power in contact with the common consumer. Recent versions of the Xbox gaming console have more
computing power than the flight computer of the Space Shuttle
34
Atlantis; the Voyager 1 unmanned probe reached interstellar
35
space in 2013 despite having less memory than an iPhone 5.
Such breathtaking improvement has made computers of all
kinds increasingly ubiquitous in the twenty-first-century world.
This power has enabled the rise of sophisticated algorithms to
model and predict our world—with great impact on society at
large and on business in particular.
A. ALGORITHMS IN DAILY LIFE
The age of the algorithm results from the synergy of mathematics, computer power, and the Internet. All three combine
to empower the collection and analysis of massive amounts of
data, and to make possible more empirically-driven
decisionmaking. Before, people might have knowingly relied on
imperfect predictions or “gut” feeling to handle complex problems of prediction in the absence of data and models. But increasingly, they can turn to a set of powerful new tools.
These tools are increasingly ubiquitous. For almost a dec36
ade, “to Google” has been a dictionary verb. Its search results
34. HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Space Shuttle Fast Facts: Xbox 360 Has More
Power than Flight Computer, Orbiter Has 2.5 Million Parts, AL.COM (July 8,
2011, 7:01 AM), http://blog.al.com/space-news/2011/07/space_shuttle_fast_
facts_xbox.html.
35. Amanda Wills, Voyager 1 Got to Deep Space on Less Memory than
Your iPhone 5, MASHABLE (Sept. 12, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/09/12/
voyager-1-iphone-5.
36. See Candace Lombardi, Google Joins Xerox As a Verb, CNET (July 6,
2006), http://cnet.com/newsgoogle-joins-xerox-as-a-verb (reporting “Google” be-
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have long been the product of an algorithm, PageRank, that
drives its results by steering Web-search traffic to sites that the
37
algorithm concludes that users believe to be most relevant. In
addition to collecting and crunching data on which sites users
click on after doing particular searches, the algorithm also
gives more credibility to sites linked to by other sites and hubs
it concludes are influential.
The application of algorithmic autonomous decisionmaking
has already moved beyond cyberspace, and has done so at a
pace that was unanticipated, even by well-informed experts. A
decade ago experts asserted that driverless cars were techno38
logically infeasible, to little controversy. Recently, to much
media coverage, Google has piloted versions of such vehicles
that rely on data collection via sensors as well as software that
applies algorithmic processes; such cars already drive more
39
safely than the average human. However, all of this attention
to Google has somewhat obscured the speed with which traditional automakers are deploying similar technology: Nissan intends to market such a vehicle by 2020, Ford and GM have similar plans, and Daimler-Benz already has a Mercedes concept
40
car rolling autonomously down German autobahns. But with
ing added to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as a verb).
37. For a clear, concise and entertaining description of the PageRank algorithm, see STEVEN STROGATZ, THE JOY OF X: A GUIDED TOUR OF MATH,
FROM ONE TO INFINITY 191–98 (2013). See also AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D.
MEYER, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: THE SCIENCE OF SEARCH ENGINE
RANKINGS 31–45 (2006) (explaining the mathematics of Google’s PageRank
system). Certain tweaks to the algorithm over time have raised concerns about
the neutrality or fairness of Google’s algorithmic process to competitors as well
as downstream web businesses. See United States v. Google, Inc., No. CV 1204177 SI, 2012 WL 5833994, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) (granting an
injunction regulating actions by Google); see also Frank Pasquale & Oren
Bracha, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in
the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008) (questioning if search
engines should be regulated like personal data collectors).
38. See FRANK LEVY & RICHARD J. MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LABOR: HOW COMPUTERS ARE CREATING THE NEXT JOB MARKET 28–30 (Princeton U. Press 2004) (“[A] truck driver [possesses] the schema to recognize what
[she is] confronting. But articulating this knowledge and embedding it in software for all but highly structured situations are at present enormously difficult tasks. . . . Computers cannot easily substitute for humans [in driving and
similar tasks].”).
39. See Radhika Sanghani, Google Driverless Cars are “Safer” than Human Drivers, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co
.uk/technology/google/10411238/Googles-driverless-cars-are-safer-than-human
-drivers.html (reporting a study making the comparison with data).
40. See Alexis Madrigal, By the Time Your Car Goes Driverless, You Won’t
Know the Difference, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Mar. 20, 2014, 9:23 AM),
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this technology comes the policy question of whether the algorithm should be designed to do something individually rational,
such as save a single passenger’s life, even if it is socially infe41
rior, such as killing ten pedestrians in the process. This type
of ethical and legal question will likely occur in other fields that
42
confront algorithmic processing, including antitrust law.
On another dimension, algorithmic processes have altered
the ways in which people conduct their affairs in realms that
are usually seen to be less cold-bloodedly rational than Internet
43
searching or driving. Online dating systems, such as eHarmony, have grown in scope and influence even as they have
44
evolved in sophistication. These services’ algorithms have
garnered greater autonomy in matching customers, particularly as they have learned that they can be more successful by
matching their customers based on data collected about them
rather than by solely focusing on what their customers actually
45
say they are looking for in a partner. Algorithmic processes
have similarly penetrated into health care spheres that tradi46
tionally mix uneasily with commerce. The process by which
available donor organs come to be matched with those who
47
need transplants has become increasingly automated. If
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/03/04/285740673/by-the-time
-your-car-goes-driverless-you-wont-know-the-difference (describing recent developments in driverless cars).
41. See Eric Limer, Should Your Driverless Car Kill You to Save Two People?, GIZMODO (May 12, 2014), http://gizmodo.com/should-your-driverless-car
-kill-you-to-save-two-other-p-1575246184 (questioning whether a driverless
car should sacrifice its driver in a crash to save more lives).
42. See infra Part IV.
43. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 146–80 (1994)
(discussing economic rationality and human sexual behavior); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987)
(discussing economic rationality and babyselling).
44. See DAN SLATER, LOVE IN THE TIME OF ALGORITHMS: WHAT TECHNOLOGY DOES TO MEETING AND MATING 86–87 (2013) (describing the complex
process of matchmaking on eHarmony).
45. See David DiSalvo, Why the Future of Online Dating Relies on
Ignoring You, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
daviddisalvo/2013/12/07/why-the-future-of-online-dating-relies-on-ignoring
-you (arguing that dating websites should use algorithms instead of personal
submissions to determine ideal matches).
46. See Vinod Khosla, Do We Need Doctors or Algorithms, TECH CRUNCH
(Jan. 10, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/10/doctors-or-algorithms (advocating for increased use of algorithms to aid in more efficient healthcare and
diagnoses).
47. See STEINER, supra note 10, at 149–51 (discussing use of algorithms to
make matches for transplants); see also Henry Hansmann, The Economics and
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y L. 57 (consid-
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Americans increasingly delegate driving, love, and life-anddeath decisions to automated algorithms, few areas can remain
off-limits.
B. THE RISE OF THE MACHINES—SEND IN THE ROBO-SELLERS
Where driving, love, and life mix as ingredients, one might
cook up shopping. Algorithmic processes already meld into
software that autonomously makes pricing and output decisions based on market conditions, and then make offers to con48
sumers. Indeed, this capability has become commonplace in
some non-physical markets. Already, finance and the travel industry make ample use of software that algorithmically adjusts
prices based on supply and demand data. Relatedly, existing
software tools alter prices to consumers based on information
about changes in demand. Increasingly, decisions on the sales
of physical products are delegated to algorithm-driven robosellers.
Initially, algorithmic pricing and automated trading
49
emerged as a seismic force in finance. The ability of computers
to gather, digest, and act has fundamentally transformed finance from a human-dominated business to one co-inhabited by
humans and computers in synergy, in a kind of “cyborg fi50
nance.” Aided by SEC regulations that fostered technological
51
change, finance-industry participants have deployed incredibly powerful and speedy computers that analyze and make
52
trades using complex mathematical models.
ering impacts of market and nonmarket incentives for organ donation).
48. See, e.g., Barney Jopson, Amazon “Robo-Pricing” Sparks Fears, FIN.
TIMES (Jul. 8, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26c5bb7a-c12f
-11e1-8179-00144feabdc0.html; SLATER, supra note 44.
49. For a description of the rise of algorithmic trading in finance—and a
harsh critique of its misuse, see MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET
REVOLT (2014). See also SAL AMUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS:
HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL
STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 141–
50 (2012) (describing how algorithms are used in trading stocks today); SCOTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET (2013) (describing the practice and future of
using algorithms in stock trading).
50. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 687
(2013) (stating that “[m]odern finance is cyborg finance” as “the key players
are part human and part machine”).
51. Id. at 688 (describing how Reg ATS and Reg NMS permitted new trading systems and the development of electronic communications networks linking existing previously separate markets).
52. See SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH
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The entry of algorithm-driven software into the financial
industry has raised concerns about its safety and impact on the
investing public. Notably, the May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash,” in
which $1 trillion in market value vanished in less than an
hour, raised doubts about algorithm-driven automated trading,
as SEC and CFTC inquiries concluded that such traders played
53
a significant role. More broadly, however, concerns have arisen that automated trading exposes the investing public to new,
large-scale risks, including the possibility of harder-to-detect
insider trading, the potential for asymmetries of speed to
unlevel the securities playing field against smaller investors,
and the weakness of existing disclosure regimes in the new con54
text.
The tools employed in finance have migrated into the sales
of non-financial products. Initially, these tools made their ap55
pearance on online retail sites, such as Amazon. Just as they
did with financial markets, such tools drove an increasingly
high rate of price variability in response to massive rapid com56
petitive data collection. For example, in November 2012, during the lead-up to the holiday season, Amazon made 2.5 million
price changes per day utilizing such technologies; brick-andmortar retailers such as Wal-Mart operating more traditionally
only made about 50,000 price changes during that entire
57
month. The promise of such technology is to steal away customers from rivals by responding more nimbly to changes in
supply and demand—the epitome of competition.
However, as in the financial industry, the implementation
of algorithm-based trading in other markets has had its hiccups. In addition to the previously-mentioned problems with
$23 million dollar biology textbooks, Amazon has had to battle
the creation of “dummy” accounts formed only to try to trick
WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 36–38 (2010)
(describing the strategy of convertible bond arbitrage).
53. CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6,
2010, 1 (2010).
54. For an overview of these concerns, see LEWIS, supra note 49. See also
Lin, supra note 50, at 720–21 (discussing the use of technology in finance).
55. See Jopson, supra note 48 (discussing use of financial-industry derived
algorithms on Amazon and other online retailers).
56. Id. (noting that “[h]igh-speed trading tools pioneered in the stock
market are increasingly driving price movements on Amazon as sellers use
them to undercut” each other).
57. Tom Ryan, Amazon’s Price Changing Machine, RETAILWIRE (Dec. 19,
2013),
http://www.retailwire.com/discussion/17222/amazons-price-changing
-machine.
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other algorithms into mispricing goods on the site. United Airlines has famously had to deal with algorithms that mistakenly
59
priced and offered consumers airfares as low as $5. Such errors appear to be the exception rather than the rule, however,
and the adoption of such technology continues apace.
At the same time, so-called “dynamic pricing” has also
spread beyond its initial beachhead in the sale of travel and
utilities. The term “dynamic pricing” has recently come to overlap with, and at times include, the sort of algorithmic-based
trading that emerged in the financial sector. Initially, however,
it denoted pricing based on proxies for competitive intelligence
about demand, such as time of day, season, or weather. For example, airlines increase the price of tickets to Colorado ski destinations based on the availability of snow, and electrical utilities charge less per kilowatt-hour during nighttime, when air
60
conditioning is used less. Some vending machines already
possess sensors by which they adjust beverage prices based on
61
the outside temperature.
In these early manifestations, dynamic pricing merely used
crude stand-ins—time, temperature, season—to make ballpark
estimates of changes in demand. However, with greater data
collection and high-powered data analysis, the possibility of
measuring demand more precisely has emerged. As a result,
the term dynamic pricing has come to also include algorithmic
pricing in which directly collected competitive data on supply
62
and demand is used to drive automated pricing decisions.
58. See Jopson, supra note 55 (describing dummy accounts).
59. See Hugo Martin, Glitch Causes United to Sell Tickets for as Little as
$2.50, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/lafi-mo-glitch-causes-united-to-sells-tickets-for-as-little-as-250-20130912,0,
488189.story (noting the glitch appears to have been the product of how United’s pricing algorithm dealt with fuel surcharges); Nick Vivion, Exploiting Air
Fare Glitches: The Moral, the Righteous and the Opportunistic, TNOOZ
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.tnooz.com/article/exploiting-fare-glitches-moral
-righteous-opportunistic (presenting arguments for and against conducting
extensive fare searches).
60. See Lisa Magloff, Dynamic Pricing Strategy, HOUS. CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/dynamic-pricing-strategy-5117.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (describing the concept of dynamic pricing).
61. See Evgeny Morozov, Requiem for Our Wonderfully Inefficient World,
SLATE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/
2013/04/senor_based_dynamic_pricing_may_be_efficient_but_it_could_create_
inequality.html.
62. Examples include IBM’s DemandTec Price Optimization software. See
IBM Price Optimization, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/
price-optimization (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
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Notwithstanding the terminology, this development is a natural—and critical—progression that can provide important benefits to producers and consumers in more efficiently matching
supply with demand.
Software tools already exist to help firms optimize their
63
prices to achieve sales, volume, profit, and price objectives. Increasingly sophisticated software solutions model and forecast
the interdependence between supply and demand to predict
market prices for commodities, and in turn propose—and exe64
cute—pricing strategies. At the same time, the nascent field of
demand chain optimization—the flip side of the more familiar
field of supply chain management—is trying to use software
and mathematical algorithms to proactively manage the pull of
consumer demand and its effects on a firm and its suppliers.
Firms already, right now, cede pricing decisions to algorithm-laden software tools that monitor supply and demand.
No longer are robo-sellers deployed only to sell services and intangible products. Increasingly, they are being used to sell
physical-world products, such as cereal and cameras, both
online and in concert with brick-and-mortar stores. Consider a
description of how retailers use the Mercent software platform:
[O]nce we have the information from the retailer’s line of business
software systems, we layer in our own real-time Web analytics. That
tracks where shoppers are coming from . . . what they’re buying, and
most recently we’ve added to that data mix real-time monitoring of
product availability and pricing so that our clients can use the
Mercent platform to keep tabs on what’s happening in the [broader]
market. And the rate at which we’re able to collect that competitive
intelligence, match competitor products against our clients’ own catalog, and then ultimately determine a new price point for the SKU
[stock keeping unit, denoting a distinct product and its attributes for
inventory management], is currently at about 2 million products per
65
hour.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., PROS PRICING SOLUTION SUITE, http://microsoft-sapphire
.com/orlando/resources/Partners/PROS/PROS_Pricing_Solution_Suite.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2016) (describing software solution that claims to “[c]reate the
right price for each customer and product by setting science-based optimized
pricing strategies and automating price list management”); see also Heather
Clancy, This Analytics Software Keeps the Price Right, in Near Real Time,
FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/pros-pricing-software
(describing software sold by firms such as Zilliant, Vendavo as well as PROS,
that “can analyze historic pricing and, through analysis, come up with better
pricing for managing margin”).
65. Steven Cherry, Dynamic Pricing: “How Much” Is Not a Simple Question, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 15, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/
podcast/telecom/internet/dynamic-pricing-how-much-is-not-a-simple-question.
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Delegating competitive intelligence gathering and pricing
to a robo-seller creates the ability to collect and crunch competitive data and respond more quickly than is humanly possible.
Brick-and-mortar stores, such as Best Buy and Macy’s, already
use algorithmic processes to react to fast changes in price driv66
en by their customers’ use of competing online sellers.
In short, competitive response and pricing decisions are increasingly being transferred away from humans to algorithmdriven software. Tools formerly—and famously—deployed first
in the financial sector are migrating into the real economy of
goods and services in which virtually all Americans participate.
This process can be expected to continue and accelerate. Were
these tools merely to provide speed and accuracy, but not otherwise alter market outcomes, they would not be a source of antitrust concern. However, as we have seen in the financial markets, the possibility of market distortion exists—technological
tools have been used to capture consumer surplus for producers
67
in the context of securities trading. As these tools migrate into
the goods and services market, similar injury to consumer welfare, arguably antitrust’s heartland, may also loom.
The possibility of implementing such algorithmic pricing
has provided a significant boost to efforts to collect and use all
sorts of demand-relevant data in order to more effectively sell
to consumers. These efforts have drawn criticism, particularly
from consumer advocates. Some worry about the privacy implications of turning data about all sorts of individual choices and
acts—including those not explicitly involving commerce, such
as how and when one drives, brushes ones teeth, or goes to
68
bed—into, effectively, a class of saleable information assets.
Others contend that sellers will be able not merely to better
calculate a demand curve for their products, but will actually
be able to gauge an individual’s demand, so as to increase prof69
its through increasingly powerful price discrimination. Those
66. Cummings, supra note 22; see Macy’s Peers into the Hearts of Consumers with Predictive Analytics, RETAIL INFO SYSTEMS NEWS, (May 19, 2014),
http://risnews.edgl.com/retail-news/Macy-s-Peers-Into-the-Hearts-ofCustomers-with-Predictive-Analytics-92848 (describing Macy’s use of algorithms).
67. See LEWIS, supra note 49, at 37–43 (discussing these distortions).
68. See Evgeny Morozov, Silicon Valley Is Turning Our Lives into an Asset
Class, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
9d2a73fe-a54a-11e3-8070-00144feab7de.html (describing how companies make
commodities out of personal habits).
69. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text; see also Douglas M.
Kochelek, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 521–23
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concerns may be important, but have not traditionally been
70
central to antitrust enforcers’ focus. Most relevantly for this
Article, though, is the potential for data collection and algorithmic pricing to lead to conduct that, while profitable for a
71
firm, is harmful to consumer welfare, and difficult to address
with existing antitrust law approaches.
II. ROBO-SELLERS, ACCURACY, SPEED, AND
OLIGOPOLY
The increasing prevalence of oligopolies in the American
economy, and the seeming impotence of antitrust and federal
regulatory policy to deal with their overweening political influence and their market power over consumers, have become
matters of popular concern well beyond merely antitrust, economic, or legal circles. In recent years, Professor Tim Wu has
72
written about this issue in The New Yorker; similarly,
The Atlantic has asked whether “more mergers” and “fewer
73
players” spells “the end of competitive capitalism?” Other
commentators in the popular press have reached beyond antitrust’s standard microeconomic and innovation concerns to ar(2009) (“If a monopoly firm could determine and charge the value that each
individual customer placed on the good and could maintain the price discrimination scheme, then that firm could . . . charge each consumer the maximum
value he would be willing to pay.”); Morozov, supra note 61 (describing dynamic pricing in technology; see also Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics and
Price Discrimination on the Internet, DIGITAL TECH. CTR., http://www.dtc
.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/privacy.economics.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (noting the tension between price discrimination and privacy online).
70. But see Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust Concerns, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 32, 42–47 (2007) (criticizing the
outcome in Leegin, in which the Court declined to uphold per se illegality of
vertical minimal price fixing); J. Thomas Rosch, The Common Law of Section
2: Is It Still Alive and Well?, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163 (2008) (discussing
the Chicago School in Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence); Peter Swire &
Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer
Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335 (2013) (discussing
the “lock-in” problem with the right to data portability).
71. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191, 191–201 (2008) (describing the concepts of consumer welfare and
efficiency.
72. Tim Wu, The Oligopoly Problem, NEW YORKER (Apr. 15, 2013), http://
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-oligopoly-problem (describing modernday oligopolies).
73. Jordan Weissman, The Return of the Monopoly, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/the-chartist/
309271.
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gue that contemporary oligopolies pose real risks to our political and economic system, asserting related engendering of the
2007–08 Financial Meltdown and the ensuing “Great Reces74
sion.”
To the extent that the effects of increased oligopoly fall
through the cracks of antitrust law, the advent of the roboseller may widen those cracks into chasms. For several reasons,
the robo-seller should increase the power of oligopolists to
charge supracompetitive prices: the increased accuracy in detecting changes in price, greater speed in pricing response, and
reduced irrationality in discount rates all should make the
robo-seller a more skillful oligopolist than its human counterpart in competitive intelligence and sales. Leading scholars
have long appreciated antitrust law’s weakness in dealing with
oligopoly; the robo-seller is poised to strike powerfully at this
weakness, to the detriment of consumers. Moreover, the roboseller should also enhance the ability of oligopolists to create
durable cartels.
A. THE EXISTING CRACK IN THE SHERMAN ACT
Black-letter antitrust law makes clear that Section 1 of the
75
Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive “agreements.” For
many judges, lawyers, and other interested observers, that is
the end of the story. Given the archetypal application of Section 1’s text to price-fixing and restrictions on output, that conclusion is not completely unjustified; generally, interdependent
parallel conduct, without more, has not been held to satisfy
76
Section 1’s “agreement” language.
However, economists and leading antitrust law experts
concur that, if we are concerned with anticompetitive pricing,
the agreement requirement creates “a fairly wide crack” in U.S.

74. See, e.g., BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 248 (2010) (decrying increased concentration of markets and arguing that “no longer . . . can [we] fix the physical
flaws in our financial and industrial systems without first resolving the basic
flaws in our political economy,” which the author argues are interlinked);
Zephyr Teachout, The Madisonian Impulse Behind Antitrust Law, NATION
(May 18, 2009), http://www.thenation.com/blog/madisonian-impulse-behindantitrust-law (arguing Americans are growing used to monopolies).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014).
76. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1428 (2d ed.
2001) (stating that “mere interdependent parallelism has not been held to constitute agreement” but continuing on to discuss the arguments for doing so).
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antitrust law for socially harmful conduct to fall through. As
Louis Kaplow has observed, “what economics teaches about
why we should be concerned about price fixing not only fails to
support reasoning offered in favor of a heightened agreement
requirement, but also cuts against it because the cases exonerated . . . are those that involve the greatest rather than the
78
least social harm.”
Indeed, this is a debate that goes back half a century to arguments by Judge Richard Posner and Donald Turner; it has
been rekindled by others more recently. Posner advocated a
very broad interpretation of Section 1’s language that would
reach interdependent pricing by oligopolists, even where they
do not make an agreement in the common sense of the term:
[A] seller communicates his ‘offer’ by restricting output, and the offer
is ‘accepted’ by the actions of his rivals in restricting their outputs as
well. . . . Businessmen should have no difficulty, moreover, in determining when they are behaving noncompetitively. Tacit collusion is
not an unconscious state. If the sales division of a company recommends that it offer a wider variety of products in order to exploit consumer demand more effectively, and the financial division recommends against that course on the ground that it will make it more
difficult for the industry to maintain ‘healthy’ prices, top management
can be in no doubt of the significance of its actions if it adopts the fi79
nancial division’s recommendation.

As a result, Posner argued for the application of the Sherman Act to firms that priced interdependently, even where they
did not communicate or signal their intent to each other apart
80
from observing each other’s price decisions.
Likewise, Turner agreed that the term “agreement” could
not be limited only to conventional understandings of an explicit agreement—requiring proof of price-fixing contract formation
would eviscerate Section 1, and at any rate was only one of several possible interpretations of the agreement language in the
81
statutory text. However, Turner thought that an approach
like Posner’s was a bridge too far. First, Turner concluded that
punishing businesspeople for such behavior was problematic,
77. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 157 (2003).
78. Kaplow, supra note 30, at 689.
79. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1576–92 (1969).
80. Id.
81. See Turner, supra note 30, at 664–65 (suggesting through comparison
between explicit and non-spoken communication that the former is sufficient
but not necessary for an inference of agreement required for a Section 1 violation).
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since, as in a competitive industry, they were simply rationally
82
optimizing their prices given market realities. Additionally,
Turner thought that courts were ill-equipped to regulate and
remedy the pricing decisions that such an interpretation would
83
identify as illegal.
The Posner-Turner discussion has been recently rekindled.
Although Posner himself has recently walked back from his
84
original argument, Louis Kaplow has picked up Posner’s ba85
ton and continued the run. Kaplow has cast doubt on notions
of “agreement” required for Section 1 liability “other than in86
terdependence” of decisionmaking. He has further criticized
courts’ reliance on “communications” for defining “agreement”
and determining liability as an approach that is “hard to make
operational” and “unconnected with the modern theory of oli87
gopoly.” He argues that, given well-accepted models of oligopoly, “the cases exonerated on the ground that they involve mere
interdependence are those that involve the greatest rather than
88
the least social harm.” Despite these critiques, courts continue
to impose an agreement requirement in a manner that often
requires proof of direct communication or proxies for it, and
89
this approach continues to have strong defenders.
82. Id. at 666 (“[E]ach seller in [an oligopolistic supracompetitive pricing
situation], in refraining from price competition, is not agreeing with his competitors but simply throwing their probable decisions into his price calculus as
impersonal market facts. . . . [I]t seems questionable to call the behavior of
oligopolists in setting their prices unlawful when the behavior in essence is
identical to that of sellers in a competitive industry.”).
83. See id. at 669–70.
84. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 782 F.3d 867, 874
(7th Cir. 2015) (“Harvard Law School Professor Louis Kaplow . . . argues that
tacit collusion should be deemed a violation of the Sherman Act. That of course
is not the law, and probably shouldn’t be.”); see also Richard Posner, Review of
Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 763
(2014) (book review) (“I now think that I didn’t sufficiently appreciate the force
of Turner’s doubts about the feasibility of an antitrust remedy for tacit collusion.”).
85. See Kaplow, supra note 30, at 797, 815 (criticizing reliance on “communications” to determine liability and casting doubt on notions of “agreement” required for Section 1 liability “other than interdependence”); see also
LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING (2013).
86. Kaplow, supra note 30, at 815.
87. Id. at 685.
88. Id. at 689.
89. See, e.g., Page, supra note 30, at 200 (“[T]he lessons of game theory,
experimental economics, real-world cartels, and dispositions of price-fixing
cases over the past four decades support refocusing the analysis and investigation of concerted action on the role of communication.”). But see Jon Fougner,
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All things being equal, the advent of the robo-seller shifts
the balance between these arguments in the direction of Posner’s half-century-old argument. Contemporary discussions of
antitrust policy are dominated by the application of the errorcost framework associated with Frank Easterbrook’s landmark
90
article The Limits of Antitrust. Under this rubric, upon which
the Supreme Court seemed to draw in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
91
Twombly, the choice of optimal antitrust rules must balance
their benefits against the error and administrative costs that
92
they spawn. Automated pricing powered by algorithmic processing and mass data collection should reduce the costs to
firms to the interdependent pricing that concerned Posner, and
that continues to worry Kaplow.
B. STANDARD OLIGOPOLY MODELS AND THE ROBO-SELLER
The reasons that the robo-seller makes interdependent
pricing more feasible can be demonstrated by considering a
very simple Cournot model oligopoly in which two firms produce the same good (no product differentiation) and simultaneously and independently select the quantity that they produce.
These assumptions are crucial, though they do make the model
a solid fit for industries with a lag between investment and
production, such as pharmaceuticals, information technology
hardware, and agriculture. One might question the choice of a
model in which sellers set quantities, when robo-sellers, though
increasingly being integrated into the supply chain, are for now
93
primarily used for price changes. The simple answer is that it
is the best model for assessing oligopolistic behavior; as leading
economist Xavier Vives has written, “[a]fter one hundred and
fifty years the Cournot model remains the benchmark of price

Antitrust Enforcement in Private Equity: Target, Bidder, and Club Sizes
Should Matter, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 36–37 (2013) (asking whether parallel
conduct in the shadow of possible tit-for-tat retaliation is excluded from antitrust liability by Twombly).
90. Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
91. 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007) (discussing the impact of discovery costs
and the fear of large erroneous judgments that even low plausibility claims
spawn).
92. See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. AND PUB. POL’Y 1, 22–23
(2010); Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long
Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL,
2009–10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 369, 382 (2010).
93. See supra Part I.B.
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94

formation under oligopoly.” The contrasting Bertrand model
implies that if firms select prices, then only two firms are required to achieve a perfectly competitive price level; but the
Bertrand model’s theoretical result proves dubious empirical95
ly. As a result, the Cournot model is a better choice for modeling real-world oligopolies.
Working through the model, suppose q1 denotes the quantity firm 1 chooses and q2 denotes firm 2’s choice, and that the
demand for the product is given by an inverse relationship between quantity and price (as is normal) given by the function p
= 1 – q1 – q2. To simplify, assume the cost of production to be zero. As a result, firm 1’s payoff is its revenue (the price times the
quantity chosen) minus cost, or
(1 – q1 – q2)q1
and firm 2’s payoff will be
(1 – q1 – q2)q2.
Since firm 1’s payoff function is a parabola with the open
part facing down, its optimal strategy can be found by taking
the partial derivative of its payoff function with respect to q1
and setting it equal to zero (thereby finding a maximum point),
yielding
1 – 2q1 – q2 = 0.
Solving for q1, we get q1 = 0.5 – q2/2, and since firm 2’s payoff function is identical, firm 2’s best response is q2 = 0.5 – q1/2.
As a result of this symmetry, q1 = q2, which yields the result
that each firm will produce the Nash equilibrium quantity of
96
97
1/3, which implies positive profits of 1/9. As has been ob94. Xavier Vives, Cournot and the Oligopoly Problem, 33 EUR. ECON. REV.
503, 511 (1989).
95. See ANDREW LEDVINA & RONNIE SIRCAR, DYNAMIC BERTRAND AND
COURNOT COMPETITION: ASYMPTOTIC AND COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 1 (2012), https://www.princeton.edu/~sircar/
Public/ARTICLES/dynBvsCprodDiff.pdf (“[T]he original Bertrand model results in perfect competition in all cases besides monopoly, which is unrealistic
in most settings, leading one to conclude that the correct set-up leads to the
wrong result.”).
96. q1 = 0.5 – q2/2
q2 = 0.5 – q1/2
substituting for q2 in the first equation: q1 = 0.5 – ( (0.5 – q1/2) / 2)
2q1 = 1 – 1/2 + q1/2
4q1 = 2 – 1 + q1
3q1 = 1
q1 = 1/3
and substituting 1/3 for q1 back into the second equation in the list, q2 = 1/3.
97. Substituting 1/3 for q1 and q2 in the first equation—the payoff function
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served for over a century, this means that each firm will price
at a supracompetitive level rather than competing away all
profit to cost (zero in this example) as in a perfectly competitive
market, even though they are not explicitly colluding, but
merely calculating their best response given the duopoly and
the market realities they face.
This result—that the Nash equilibrium is higher than the
competitive level—also obtains for industries with more than
two players, though the margin above the competitive level de98
creases as the number of firms increases. The point is not that
a Cournot model is the best or only depiction of oligopoly. Rather, the general implication is that even if the firms are unable to explicitly communicate or agree, to maximize revenue
they will each independently choose a quantity to produce
which will result in a price that exceeds marginal cost—and is
thus higher than the socially-optimal competitive price—
99
though it also falls short of the monopoly price. Such a result
is also possible given certain assumptions in a Bertrand model,
100
in which the firms directly choose price rather than quantity.
Moreover, as Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out:
One reason antitrust needs to take game theoretic solutions such as
Cournot’s more seriously is that the resulting arrangements can be
more stable than cartel solutions. Under collusion each firm has marginal revenues that greatly exceed marginal costs. This makes cheatfor each firm—yields (1 – 1/3 – 1/3)(1/3) = 1/9.
98. Indeed, this is the central implication of the Cournot Limit Theorem,
under which equilibrium pricing continues to be higher than perfect competition, but lower than in a monopoly, though prices approach the perfectly competitive level as the number of firms increases. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 224–28 (1988) (discussing the Cournot model
and limit behavior); see also ROY GARDNER, GAMES FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 127 (2d ed. 2003) (“[W]hen the number of firms grows large[,] . . .
quantity competition approaches as a limit perfect competition, a result known
as the Cournot limit theorem.”).
99. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 159 (“[E]conomists have argued
that firms in concentrated markets can increase their prices above the competitive level without expressly communicating . . . [and] the resulting social loss
[from oligopoly] (as compared to competitive behavior by firms with the same
costs) seems to be quite substantial.”); James W. Friedman, A Non-cooperative
Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 11 (1971); see also
Kaplow, supra note 30, at 783–84 (“[F]irms in an oligopoly setting may indeed
be able to sustain coordinated supracompetitive prices . . . regardless of
whether each firm’s expectation about the other’s reaction arises from their
mutual appreciation of their situation or is a consequence of direct discussions
of the matter.”).
100. See Kaplow, supra note 30, at 784 (detailing a similar repeated game
version of a Bertrand model that results in “coordinated supracompetitive
prices” despite the absence of legally enforceable agreements).
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ing [on one’s cartel partners by reverting to a competitive market
price despite an agreement to fix prices] highly profitable. By contrast, in the Cournot equilibrium each firm is maximizing its profits,
and no one has an incentive to deviate. For this reason Cournot-style
oligopolies may be a much more substantial competitive problem in
101
concentrated markets than are classic cartels.

Hovenkamp made this point almost a decade ago, well before
the deployment of robo-sellers.
To the extent that mass data collection and automated, algorithmic pricing convey a better understanding of market conditions to oligopolists, the risk of social harm due to Cournotstyle oligopolies will rise. Robo-sellers should be more effective
than humans at sussing out the right choice of quantity or price
in the absence of explicit agreement or communications. As a
result, instances in which humans would be cognitively incapable of assessing their competitors’ responses become at the
margin much more feasible. All things being equal, the probability that market players can successfully adopt Cournot-style
interdependent pricing should rise.
C. THE ROBO-SELLER AND PRICE-FIXING AMONG OLIGOPOLISTS
The speed of response depends upon the time required to detect a given choice by the other player. The shorter this time is, the more stable
cooperation can be. A rapid detection means that the next move in the
interaction comes quickly, thereby increasing the shadow of the future.
102

–Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation

In his classic study of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Robert Axelrod invited experts to participate in a stylized computer competition in which their dueling software programs
played a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. We are at the dawn of
the deployment of the robo-seller, in which computers will participate in real-world market competition. One possible outcome: collusion and cartels, which are widely understood to be
a solution to a real-world repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Axelrod’s experiment is on the verge of becoming our real world.
To wit, while robo-sellers exacerbate the problem of oligopoly by potentially giving individual firms the incentive to raise
prices even in the absence of coordination, they also make it
101. HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 161.
102. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984), http://
www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/axelrod.pdf (adapted
version of Axelrod’s landmark work).
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more likely that actual, and more durable, cartels will form.
That is to say, robo-sellers are likely to play the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma better than humans. Coming back to the
Cournot duopoly model in the prior section, consider again the
Nash equilibrium of q1 = q2 = 1/3, which yields a payoff of 1/9 for
each firm. While this is better for the firms than a sociallyoptimal, perfectly competitive market, in which price would
equal marginal cost, it is worse for them than if they could
103
share the monopoly level of output and each produced 1/4,
which would give them each revenue of 1/8 (which is greater
104
than 1/9). This outcome would require each firm to cooperate
or coordinate to lower its output (because 1/4 is less than 1/3).
If the two firms interact every day, potentially infinitely,
we can consider the implications of an infinitely repeated version of the Cournot duopoly, in which each stage is as described
105
in the static model previously. A possibility that emerges significantly in the literature is that each firm will adopt a grimtrigger strategy (also referred to as “Nash reversion,” since the
106
parties return to the original Nash equilibrium). Each firm
will select an output of 1/4, until and unless the other firm de107
fects and selects 3/8 (which will increase its revenue), in
which case the “victim” firm will forever select 1/3, causing the
other firm to also thereafter forever select 1/3—thus reverting
to the noncooperative equilibrium described in Part II.B. Economists have observed that one of the most effective methods of
deterring cartel cheaters is for other cartel members to credibly
threaten to lower their own price to the competitive level if

103. Consider a single firm model in which revenue is (1 – q) q. Setting the
partial derivative to zero yields 1 – 2q = 0, or q = 1/2. Splitting this monopoly
level between two firms q1 and q2 equally means each produces 1/4.
104. If q1 = q2 = 1/4, then, per the payoff formulae in the prior section:
Firm 1’s payoff is (1 – q1 – q2) q1 = (1/2)(1/4) = 1/8
and
Firm 2’s payoff is (1 – q1 – q2) q2 = (1/2)(1/4) = 1/8.
105. See, e.g., JAMES N. WEBB, GAME THEORY: DECISIONS, INTERACTION
AND EVOLUTION 107–08 (2007); William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 411 (2011) (“[F]irms in an
oligopoly are players in a repeated game.”).
106. See AXELROD, supra note 102 (discussing Robert Axelrod’s experiment
detailed in The Evolution of Cooperation).
107. If firm 1 is the defector, and firm 2 does not defect, firm 1’s payoff
function will be (1 – (1/4) – q1)q1, since firm 2 is selecting 1/4. Setting the partial derivative with respect to q1 to zero yields 1 – 1/4 – 2q1 = 0, or 2q1 = 3/4,
which yields q1 = 3/8, the output that maximizes the defector’s revenue.
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108

cheating is detected; the data collection made powerful by
robo-sellers should make detection cheaper and more accurate.
As a result, cooperation will generate a firm the payoff of
2
3
(1/8) ( 1 + d + d + d + . . . ) = 1 / ( 8 (1 – d) ).
Selecting 3/8 means that the firm will get 9/64 (> 1/8 =
109
8/64) in the first period, but that it will get a discounted (by a
per-period discount rate d) 1/9 in all subsequent periods, which
sums to a defection payoff stream of
9/64 + d / (9 (1 – d ) ).
As a result, collusion can only be sustained if the payoff
stream from not defecting outweighs that of defecting, or
1 / ( 8 (1 – d) ) > 9/64 + d / (9 (1 – d ) ),
which is true when d ≥ 9/17. Essentially, the question to
each individual cartel participant is whether its discount rate is
high enough that the gains from defecting in the first period
outweigh the future discounted costs from losing cartel pricing
in each subsequent period. As a result, collusion is possible as a
kind of self-enforced anticompetitive contract, when firms do
not discount too much. If they discount future payments
enough, then they prefer the current period payoff of defecting
relative to the lost future payoffs.
Three key aspects of the robo-seller exacerbate antitrust’s
current “oligopoly dilemma.” First, the effects relating to the
discount rate should make interdependent supracompetitive
pricing more stable. Second, greater accuracy in detection of
price changes will have similar effects. Finally—and perhaps
most importantly—minimization of the human factor removes
an element of irrationality and agency cost that will likely reduce the chance that a cartel is undermined by mistake or an
individual employee’s priority of her own needs over that of the
firm.
First, the robo-seller’s effects relating to the discount rate
should make cartel formation more likely and increase the stability of cartels once formed. Mass data collection and pro-

108. See Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, Cartels, Profits and Excess
Capacity, 28 INT’L ECON. REV. 413, 413–14 (1987) (noting the power of such a
threat); Garth Saloner, Excess Capacity as a Policing Device, 18 ECON. LETTERS 83, 83 (1985) (noting that the threat must be credible). See generally
AXELROD, supra note 102 (discussing how an experimental tournament of dueling computer programs playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma yielded a similar
version of a “tit-for-tat” strategy as the winner).
109. The payoff period in the first period will be (1 – 1/4 – q1)q1 since the
other firm is selecting 1/4, and plugging in 3/8 for q1 yields profit of 9/64.
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cessing should make a co-conspirator’s price cut more quickly
110
detectable. The result will be to shorten the time period between defection and detection. As a result, given a particular
discount rate, there will be a shorter time lag before the second
period in which the parties revert to the lower-profit (but still
supracompetitive) Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative
111
Cournot duopoly. All things being equal, the first period gain
from defecting will be relatively less valuable, and so the cartel
will be more stable.
Second, errors should diminish in the face of mass data collection, algorithmic processing, and automated decisionmaking.
Increased accuracy in understanding what is happening to pricing in the market should lower the possibility that a price war
112
would break out due to noisy price information. For example,
better data collection and analysis should reduce the odds that
a seller confuses a period of unusually low demand with cheat113
ing by its cartel partner. In essence, a robo-seller could come
to function much in the way that resale price maintenance can
provide certainty to an upstream cartel that agreed-upon prices

110. See Stephanie Clifford, Retail Frenzy: Prices on the Web Change Hourly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/business/
online-retailers-rush-to-adjust-prices-in-real-time.html (reporting that “[i]n
the old days, merchants sent employees into competitors’ stores to check on
pricing, and days later ‘sale’ signs reflected new markdowns” but “[n]ow, sophisticated computer programs accomplish the same goal online within hours,
and even minutes”).
111. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of SelfEnforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 300–01 (1987) (noting that “[i]f
breaches [of a price-fixing agreement] could be detected instantaneously, the
profits from breach would be driven to zero”—and the cartel would be more
stable—“because firms could punish [the breacher] immediately” by lowering
their prices in retaliation).
112. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 1430c (“[U]ncertainty
about rivals’ behavior may force each oligopolist to act more like a perfect
competitor . . . [and] [s]uch uncertainty [grows] . . . as public knowledge [about
prices] fails or lags.”); see also Jonathan Bendor, When in Doubt . . . Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 712–14 (1991)
(concluding that “noise” can lead to the collapse of a tit-for-tat strategy into
repetitive retaliation if one party mistakenly observes a defection when the
other party intended to cooperate); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 479 (2009) (observing that reliance “on informal enforcement can
break down because relational enforcement requires that each party be able to
observe and properly characterize the other’s behavior”).
113. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 30, at 788 (describing the scenario in
which a firm mistakes a period of unusually low demand for cheating by its
cartel partner).
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114

are being followed, or that certain pricing systems, such as
basing point or uniform delivered pricing, can simplify the task
115
of monitoring prices. The dissemination of price and output
information through industry practice or agreement has long
been a concern for antitrust due to its tendency to facilitate
116
price fixing; mass data collection and automated pricing possesses the potential to similarly turbocharge cartel coordination. In the corporate context more generally, Margaret Blair
and Lynn Stout, as well as Carol Rose, have observed how a titfor-tat strategy involving clear threats, including implicit ones,
can perform a role akin to that of trust in informal enforce117
ment.
Finally, implementation of algorithmic pricing and automated decisionmaking will reduce the possibility that agency
slack will lead to choices by employees that undercut a cartel.
Think, for example, about discounting again, this time by sales
and marketing staffs. Experimental economics literature
makes clear that humans do not maintain constant discount
rates over a series of time periods; rather, they tend to heavily
favor immediate payoffs, with a very large discount rate to the
next period, but a smaller discount rate for subsequent peri118
ods. Salespeople and marketers may tend to use such hyper114. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Assessing Resale Price Maintenance After
Leegin, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 191
(Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (discussing resale price maintenance after the Supreme Court’s Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision,
and noting that it can help stabilize a cartel by “restrain[ing] the ability of retailers to reduce prices” and “by making it easier to detect manufacturers who
cheat on a cartel by reducing wholesale price”).
115. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 1435f (describing how
these pricing methods can facilitate practices that promote coordination
among competitors).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333,
338 (1969) (holding that the exchange of price information between suppliers
of corrugated containers violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act); Am. Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411–12 (1921) (holding that the
“Open Competition Plan,” under which competitors in the hardwood manufacturing industry exchanged sales information, violated the Anti-Trust Act of
1890).
117. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundation of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1747–
48 (2001) (noting that the threat of retaliation by one’s peers may lead one to
“behave trustworthily”); Carol Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 531, 539–40 (discussing how employing a tit-for-tat strategy can engender confidence in one’s peers).
118. See generally Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical View, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002) (reviewing at-
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bolic discounting; this may be rational to them, since they may
be short-termers—in contrast, the firm itself is potentially immortal. To the extent that this phenomenon leads them to offer
price cuts (that management would not) that undermine a cartel, replacing their decisionmaking with robo-sellers’ should reduce that risk to cartel stability. Additionally, to the extent
that sales people might offer a lower price than the cartel price
due to intrafirm competition between them for promotions, salary increases, or similar rewards, replacing them with robosellers also displaces a source of agency slack that undermines
cartel stability.
***
The rise of the robo-seller exacerbates antitrust law’s
longstanding weakness at addressing social harm from oligopoly. Black-letter law’s blind spot when it comes to independent
price coordination—that is, without overt acts such as communication or the adoption of facilitating practices—may become a
cloaking device behind which algorithmic price coordination
can readily hide. Additionally, the challenges that face explicit
collusion by oligopolists may become easier to surmount with
mass data collection and algorithmic assistance.
III. ANTITRUST LAW’S ROBO-SELLER DILEMMA:
MONOPOLISTS AND MORE OVERT PRICE-FIXING
I invited experts in game theory to submit programs for a computer Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament—much like a computer chess
tournament. Each of these strategies was paired off with each of the
others to see which would do best overall in repeated interactions.
Amazingly enough, the winner was the simplest of all candidates
submitted. This was a strategy of simple reciprocity which cooperates
on the first move and then does whatever the other player did on the
previous move. Using an American colloquial phrase, this strategy
119
was named Tit for Tat.

–Robert Axelrod,
The Evolution of Cooperation
In contrast, antitrust law does not have a gap in dealing
with monopolists’ anticompetitive acts or with price fixing by
tempts to estimate discount rates and analyzing the preference for immediate
utility over delayed utility); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981) (estimating individual discount rates from survey data and finding that, for gains, such rates vary inversely with the size of the reward and the length of the waiting time).
119. AXELROD, supra note 102, at 2.
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firms that requires explicit coordination via communication or
facilitating practices in order for firms to come to some kind of
anticompetitive “agreement.” In these cases, usually analyzed
as a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the Nash equilibrium is to
“cheat” on the cartel and undercut each other, price fixers need
an “agreement” to avoid the inferior (for them, not consumers)
outcome of competitive pricing.
Of course, because competitive pricing instead of collusion
is socially beneficial, antitrust enforcement currently strives to
disrupt the development of reciprocity and trust that can
“solve” the Prisoner’s Dilemma that cartel participants face.
The emergence of the robo-seller will require a conceptual shift
in some of antitrust law’s bedrock doctrines. Antitrust law
evolved over the past century-plus based on an embedded assumption of personhood among the actors it seeks to regulate.
However, the robo-seller presents a new antitrust actor whose
strengths relative to humans may make it more resistant to existing antitrust methods of deterring anticompetitive harm.
Antitrust law’s approach to three central issues presumes
a human actor. First, in deciding whether Section 2 of the
Sherman Act has been violated, existing standards seek to
120
gauge a monopolist or attempted monopolist’s intent. Second,
to try to deter competitors from forming an explicit cartel
agreement in violation of Section 1, antitrust enforcement
agencies adopt policies designed to sow distrust and fear. Finally, where the existence of a cartel agreement is in question,
courts draw heavily on common law contract notions such as
whether there has been a “meeting of the minds” or “mutual
121
assent” Concepts of intent, fear, and “meeting of the minds”
presuppose quintessentially human mental states; they may
prove less useful in dealing with computer software and hardware. Each of these three issues is vitally important, since they
deal with monopolies and cartels, the prime foci of antitrust
law. Unfortunately, the approaches that current antitrust law
120. This is done either directly, see, e.g., Alon Y. Kapen, Duty To Cooperate Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Aspen Skiing’s Slippery Slope, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1047 (1987) (discussing courts’ application of monopolists’
intent); or indirectly, see, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (2005) (examining defendants’ willingness to sacrifice short-term profits for expected monopolization and the recoupment test for predatory pricing).
121. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 159 (“In determining whether such
an agreement exists, courts have relied heavily on common law contract formulations, such as ‘meeting of the minds’ or ‘mutual assent.’”).
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takes to monopolies and cartels are a poor fit for regulating the
robo-seller.
A. THE MONOPOLIST’S INTENT
Courts applying antitrust law focus on evidence of intent in
deciding whether Section 2 of the Sherman Act has been violat122
ed. They do not punish bad intent for its own sake. Rather,
123
they use intent as a guide to characterizing observed conduct.
In cases involving monopolization through exclusionary conduct, as well as attempted monopolization, courts have adopted
tests that seek to gauge the monopolist or attempted monopolist’s intent.
In dealing with exclusionary conduct, the Supreme Court
in leading cases has adopted approaches that focus on intent.
Two of the most-commented upon antitrust decisions, Aspen
and Trinko—strikingly different though their opinions may be
124
in their outlook —both look to the alleged violator’s intent. In
Aspen, the Court concluded that, for monopolization through
exclusionary conduct, evidence of intent is “relevant to the
question [of] whether the challenged conduct is fairly charac125
terized as . . . anticompetitive.” As a result, the Court held
that a monopolist’s refusal to deal may violate Section 2 if the
monopolist does not have a legitimate competitive reason for its
126
conduct.
Subsequently, the Court readdressed the issue of intent’s
role in understanding exclusionary conduct in Trinko, a case
127
that contains strong dicta limiting Aspen. In Trinko, the
Court endorsed a less plaintiff-friendly test than the one in As122. See id. at 280.
123. Id. at 280 (observing that “[m]any kinds of conduct, such as the refusal to deal with a competitor . . . [are] extremely difficult for courts to characterize” and “evidence of intent can aid courts in the characterization problem”).
124. Compare Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 600–01 (1985) (finding an exception to the rule that even a monopolist
has no duty to deal with a competitor) with Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Trinko,
540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (describing Aspen as “at or near the outer boundary
of § 2 [monopolization] liability”).
125. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602.
126. Id. at 604–05, 610 (upholding jury instruction stating that defendant
monopolist’s refusal to deal with plaintiff “does not violate Section 2 if valid
business reasons exist for that refusal” and concluding jury was justified in
concluding that defendant did not have valid business reasons).
127. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (describing Aspen as “at or near the outer
boundary of § 2 liability”).

1354

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1323

pen, one that requires evidence that the defendant monopolist
had sacrificed short-term profits by its conduct. The Trinko
court took such “profit sacrifice” to “reveal[] a distinctly anti128
competitive bent.” While commentators disagree about the
merits of the diverging approaches to intent in Aspen and
129
Trinko, both tests clearly aim at the monopolist’s intent (or
“bent”).
Courts also focus on intent in dealing with allegations of an
attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2. Justice Holmes
imported a specific intent requirement from the common law’s
approach to attempted crimes into Section 2 attempted monop130
olization over a century ago. Courts continue to apply a threepart test requiring a “specific intent to monopolize” as an ele131
ment of the offense.
Courts’ use of intent under Section 2 may well prove to become more difficult in the era of the robo-seller. Decisions to exclude, for example by refusing to sell to a particular market
participant, will not necessarily be accompanied by a record of
e-mail or suspicious paperwork from which courts may infer in132
tent. Courts’ reliance on particular changes of policy or price
from which to infer intent will be hard to square with a new
model of algorithmic selling, in which such changes may occur
thousands of times per hour. Questions of profit sacrifice may
become very difficult to answer when multiple different algo-

128. Id. at 409.
129. Compare Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and
“Sacrifice,” 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2005) (arguing against broader application
of profit-sacrifice test), with A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005) (advocating for a version of the profitsacrifice test).
130. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
131. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454–55 (1993); H.J.,
Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540–42 (8th Cir. 1989); Int’l Distribution Ctrs. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1987); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027
(9th Cir. 1981).
132. See Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold
Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 646–47 (2005) (describing, and
decrying, courts’ reliance on documents showing intent in order to interpret
potentially anticompetitive conduct); Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8
J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 801, 803 (2012) (defending reliance on such evidence to
infer intent and guide interpretation of conduct); see also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 77, at 283 (discussing the types of evidence jurors rely upon in analyzing
intent).
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rithms’ interactions are so complex that determining the “best”
price available may not be realistically possible even with the
133
fastest computers. Even where the notes of software writers
are available, they may not provide courts with evidence as
easy to digest as that of traditional sales and marketing staff.
As a result, the current approach to intent under Section 2 may
be hard to continue as algorithmic pricing and trading progress.
This would not necessarily be an unwelcome development
134
for many antitrust experts. While Herbert Hovenkamp observes that, as a positive matter, “[i]ntent has often been anti135
trust’s ghost in the machine,” he nonetheless is normatively
quite negative about intent, describing “[f]ormulations requiring ‘purpose’ or ‘intent’ [as] generally unnecessary and some136
times harmful.” Even in those contexts where the Court has
suggested other approaches to Section 2, it crafts such approaches as a proxy or filter to replace a direct inquiry into in137
tent. Similarly, Judge Posner has opined that intent should
138
not be relevant in the context of Section 1 price fixing; the
late Phillip Areeda questioned the usefulness of intent in the
139
context of Section 2 monopolization. However, in practice,
133. See Sara Robinson, Computer Scientists Find Unexpected Depths in
Airfare Search Problem, 35 SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS NEWS,
July–Aug. 2002, at 2–3; Keith Devlin, The Crazy Math of Airline Ticket Pricing, MATHEMATICS ASS’N OF AM.: DEVLIN’S ANGLE (Sept. 2002), https://
www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_09_02.html (suggesting that algorithms’ interactions are so complex that determining the actual single best
airfare currently available would take longer than a lifetime using the fastest
computers available).
134. See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. MCGOWAN, & JOEN E.
GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
U.S. V. IBM 272 (1983); see also Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 617, 652 (1999) (suggesting the place for an anti-competitive
effects test).
135. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 282.
136. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 651c.
137. See Leslie, supra note 29, at 1710–12 (observing that the recoupment
element applied by the Court in Brooke Group in the context of a predatory
price discrimination claim has been praised by its advocates as “a convenient
filter to avoid all inquiries into intent in predatory pricing cases,” and noting
that some jurisdictions continue to treat predatory intent as an element in
such cases).
138. See Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588,
595–96 (7th Cir. 1984).
139. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841(1989) (“The defendant’s intention is seldom
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purging antitrust of what is claimed to be a subjective and underdetermined inquiry continues to be theorists’ unrealized
140
dream. As a descriptive matter, investigations into human intent continue to play a significant role in antitrust analysis.
The existing intent inquiry will fit the robo-seller only with major alterations, if at all.
B. DISTRUST AND FEAR AMONG EXPLICITLY COLLUDING
COMPETITORS
The antitrust enforcement agencies’ policies against
Section 1 explicit price fixing by competitors focuses on sowing
distrust among cartel members and putting fear of criminal
punishment into them and their employees. Each of these
methods is likely to prove less effective in a world of robosellers.
Cartel behavior has long been modeled as a repeated Pris141
oner’s Dilemma. Cartel members face a problem: because
their agreement to fix a price is legally unenforceable, there is
a risk that their counterparts will defect from the agreement,
lower their prices, and increase profits at the expense of their
cartel partners. If they all do so, their collective welfare will be
worse than if they had remained faithful to their (illegal)
agreement.
As a result, cartel members must find a way to make their
142
commitments credible to each other. As Christopher Leslie
has explained, a key method is to build trust among one anoth143
er. Indeed, experimental economists have found that face-toface communication of promises in cartel simulation games,
illuminating, because every firm that denies its facilities to rivals does so to
limit competition with itself and increase its profits. Any instruction on intention must ask whether the defendant had an intention to exclude by improper
means. To get ahead in the marketplace is not itself the kind of intention that
contaminates conduct.”).
140. HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 283 (noting that business decisions are
“the product of many minds” and the “discovery search through corporate documents for evidence of specific intent is a turkey shoot”).
141. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 1; see also Ariel Rubinstein, Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion, 21 J. ECON. THEORY 1, 1–2
(1979).
142. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Selfenforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 296–97 (1987) (explaining the role
of punishment in future periods in making current period commitments credible).
143. Christopher Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV.
515, 528–31 (2004).
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even where such promises are unenforceable, helps human
players build the trust they need to cooperate in maintaining a
144
cartel. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division’s leniency program for cartel members who defect and cooperate in
145
the prosecution of their counterparts sows distrust. By rewarding the first to confess, the leniency program alters the
payoff in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma so that cooperation
becomes even more difficult; the cartel members need to be
concerned not only that their counterparts might be planning
to defect and cut prices, but also that any instability caused by
unforeseen market impacts on the cartel will trigger a race to
146
confess.
By contrast, any collusion by a robo-seller will not in the
near future involve the building of emotional trust through
face-to-face secret meetings. Instead, cartel stability will likely
be generated by more rapid detection of cheating and more
147
Credibility will likely be generated
probable retaliation.
148
through mutual expectation that swift retaliation will occur.
Whether as a result of cooperation under the leniency program or, more generally, fear of existing criminal enforcement
similarly will likely prove to be pretty weak tea in regulating
robo-sellers. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division must prove criminal intent
149
to obtain an antitrust conviction. Consequently, the Division
files criminal actions only for clearly intentional violations of
antitrust law, usually for explicit price fixing or bid rigging;
overall, by the DOJ, the FTC, and private plaintiffs, far more

144. See MIGUEL A. FONSECA & HANS-THEO NORMANN, DÜSSELDORF INST.
FOR COMPETITION ECON., EXPLICIT VS. TACIT COLLUSION: THE IMPACT OF
COMMUNICATION IN OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS 26 (Aug. 2012), http://www
.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_
Fakultaet/DICE/Discussion_Paper/065_Fonseca_Normann.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2016).
145. See Leslie, supra note 143, at 640.
146. Id.
147. See Ayres, supra note 142, at 300–01 (discussing how this would happen with human actors).
148. See, e.g., Phil Evans, Presentation Before EU Directorate Generale for
Health and Consumers: Dynamic Pricing Déjà vu All over Again—or Brave
New World 8, http://judoeconomics.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/dynamic
-pricing-pe.pptx (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (noting the ability of algorithmdriven price data collection to reduce the incentives for firms to cut prices to
consumers due to more rapid detection by competitors who are thus more likely to match price cuts).
149. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978).
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civil antitrust cases are brought than criminal ones. As discussed in Part I, imputing intent to a data-collecting, algorithm-driven software process is difficult in the civil context; it
should be even harder to find a requisite level of intent for a
criminal conviction.
Moreover, even if the intent problem were surmountable,
the rationale for criminal antitrust enforcement cannot be
squared with a world of corporate robo-sellers. The Antitrust
Division believes that incarceration is the most powerful deterrent for price fixing, since it imposes costs on employees for
151
which the employer cannot easily reimburse them; money is
believed to be incommensurable with the various nonmonetary
costs, including social stigma, to an individual of serving a sentence in federal prison. Accordingly, the Division has had a
standard policy of refusing to agree to a “no jail” sentence for a
criminal defendant, though it will plea bargain concerning the
possibility of serving a sentence in a minimum security federal
152
prison camp. In the absence of a willingness to make the difficult leap of inferring criminal intent from a robo-seller’s ac150. Only the DOJ can bring criminal antitrust actions, and it brings more
criminal actions than civil ones. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV.,
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2005–2014, http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/
download (identifying 8 civil cases filed by the DOJ and 45 criminal cases filed
that year). The FTC only brings civil cases, and a search for the same time period showed that it brought 242 competition cases. See FTC Cases and Proceedings, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/advanced
-search (select “Competition” under Mission and announcement dates from
Jan. 1, 2005 to Dec. 31, 2014) (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). Additionally, private
plaintiffs, who can only bring civil antitrust cases, file suit far more often than
the federal antitrust agencies combined. Paul E. Godek, Does the Tail Wag the
Dog? Sixty Years of Government and Private Antitrust in U.S. Courts, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2009, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/Dec09_Godek12_17f.authcheckdam.pdf (showing
roughly 1000 private civil antitrust actions filed annually in the federal courts
in recent years). The disparity between criminal and civil case numbers might
decrease where the focus is limited to Section 1 price-fixing, though such an
analysis would be very difficult since cases often involve multiple claims of anticompetitive conduct of varying strength.
151. See R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Speech Before the 2004 ICN Cartels Workshop: International AntiCartel Enforcement 12–14 (Nov. 21, 2004) (transcript available at http://www
.justice.gov/atr/file/517921/download); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, § 2R1.1 cmt. background (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004) (stating
that “the most effective method to deter individuals from committing this
crime [of price fixing] is through imposing short prison sentences coupled with
large fines”).
152. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION HANDBOOK 90–93 (2d ed. 2006).
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tions and imputing that intent to its human deployers, obviously neither reputation-harming stigma nor fear of prison are
likely to alter a robo-seller’s behavior.
C. SECTION 1 “AGREEMENT” AND A MEETING OF MINDS
In Section 1 price-fixing cases, debates over how to define
the requirement of “agreement” in the text of the Sherman Act
have drawn heavily on common law notions of contract for154
mation. As a result, courts seek to find a “meeting of the
minds” via an offer—sometimes referred to as an invitation to
155
collude—and an acceptance. A robo-seller that relies on massive data collection, machine learning, and algorithmic pricing
will not have the ability to communicate directly with other
robo-sellers in the manner that humans do. That is, robo-sellers
will not be able to conclude a meeting of the minds in an arche156
typal smoke-filled room. As a result, theories of agreement
that require explicit, direct communication—apart from mere
observance of market data and interdependent adjustment of
157
prices in response—will fit the robo-seller poorly.
Because parties to Section 1 price-fixing agreements have
strong incentives to be quite secretive about them, courts have
fashioned approaches that allow for the inference of an agreement in the absence of direct evidence. A classic statement is
found in American Tobacco Co. v. United States:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. Often crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the acts
of the person accused . . . . The essential combination or conspiracy in

153. See infra Part IV considering this argument.
154. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, § 4.2 (discussing various
ways to find a price fixing agreement).
155. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)
(holding that “[a]cceptance by competitors . . . of an invitation to participate in
a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
Sherman Act”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[Toy] manufacturers were in effect being asked by [Toys “R” Us] to reduce
their output . . . [and] [i]t accomplished this goal by inducing [them] to collude,
rather than compete.”); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007) (dismissing for failure to state a claim with “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made”).
156. See Transcript of Record, supra note 7, at 4889 (testimony of Elbert H.
Gary).
157. See, e.g., Page, supra note 30, at 178 (critiquing Kaplow and advocating an interpretation of “agreement” in section 1 that requires direct communication between competitors).
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violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing or
158
other circumstances as well as in any exchange of words.

To shape the process by which factfinders may make such
inferences, courts have pointed to “plus factors” that make
mere parallel conduct more suspicious, and to “facilitating
practices” whose adoption renders parties susceptible to liability for an anticompetitive agreement. However, neither conventional plus factors nor the approach to facilitating practices is
likely to be very helpful with robo-sellers.
Traditionally, “plus factors” have included evidence of
159
clandestine meetings and secret exchanges of information.
The delegation of competitive intelligence and pricing activities
previously done by marketing and sales people to robo-sellers
will likely render such plus factors irrelevant. Automated
agents crunching massive data collections cannot “meet” nor
will they necessarily exchange information—indeed, their ability to gather and process huge amounts of data obviates the
need to do so. Price-fixing human salespeople need to meet in
secret to conspire in significant part because they cannot actually observe each other’s prices comprehensively. As the ability
to observe or deduce each other’s price information grows via
automation, there is less need to conspire in clandestine meetings; if you can independently, rapidly, and reliably verify, the
need to meet to build trust is reduced.
Antitrust courts also have focused on the adoption by competitors of facilitating practices to infer an anticompetitive
160
agreement. Typically, such practices make collusion more
likely by changing competitors’ incentives; to the extent that
their payoffs are properly modeled as an iterative Prisoner’s Di161
lemma, facilitating practices change the payoffs they face.
Such practices include information exchanges among competitors and supply contracts provisions such as an most-favored158. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2000)
(pointing to aliases, front organizations, and the use of prostitutes to clandestinely gather information from competitors as examples of particularly egregious behavior demonstrating “an inexplicable lack of business ethics and an
atmosphere of general lawlessness”); C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United
States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir. 1952) (citing price hike during a time of
surplus). See generally, Kovacic et al., supra note 105, at 405–07.
160. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006) (holding a joint
venture that set prices as not per se illegal); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust
Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 872–73 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (discussing actions that facilitated an anticompetitive effect).
161. See infra Part II.B.
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nation clause (MFN) that enables a buyer to receive a discount
that sellers provide to another buyer or a meeting competition
clause (MCC) that requires a buyer to notify sellers and give
them a chance to meet another seller’s lower price offer; these
contract provisions have drawn significant recent scrutiny from
162
competition enforcers. Massive data collection and analysis
make information exchanges less necessary by providing the
same sort of certainty about competitors’ pricing without the
need for contractual agreement. MFNs and MCCs foster quicker detection of prices lower than those agreed upon by price fixers; under current policy, the ability to monitor and process
large amounts of pricing data should provide firms the pricecoordination benefits of these clauses without their cost in attracting the attention of antitrust enforcers.
***
New technology and its incorporation into twenty-firstcentury business models have created a mismatch between the
emerging robo-seller and the paradigms centered on human
traits that drive more than a century of antitrust legal doctrine.
The robo-seller’s lack of identifiable intent, fear, or a subjective
mind that can “meet” pose significant challenges to black-letter
antitrust law. The question, as the next section discusses, is
how antitrust enforcers can adapt to this challenge.
IV. ROBO-SELLERS: BOON OR BANE?
In The Circle, a 2013 techno-dystopian novel by bestselling
author Dave Eggers, massive data collection and processing allows an innovative and ambitious corporation to exercise harm163
ful influence on markets and consumer behavior. Attempts to
164
use antitrust law to combat its effects fail. The negative im165
pacts spin beyond markets to politics and beyond.
162. See Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Developing an Administrable MFN Policy, 27 ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 15–17 (discussing MFN clauses’ effects on competition); Steven C. Salop, Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate
Oligopoly Coordination, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN MARKET STRUCTURE (J.
Stiglitz ed. 1986), 279–83 (discussing how MCC clauses facilitate tacit collusion and deter entry, helping entrench oligopolies); Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Justice, “Contracts that Reference Rivals” Speech at Georgetown University
(April 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/contracts-reference-rivals, 3
(discussing generally contract clauses that reference a firm’s rivals’ pricing or
other actions, such as MFNs and MCCs).
163. DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE 173 (2013).
164. Id. at 174, 206, 259–60.
165. Id. at 489–91.
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In a similar vein, our inner Luddite might ask whether,
looked at purely from the increased possibility of supracompetitive pricing, robo-sellers might seem like candidates
for prohibition. However, as this Part will discuss, they do carry the promise of significant benefits that might offset the risk
they pose of decreased social welfare. Complicating matters,
however, is robo-sellers’ own complexity; existing competition
enforcers may struggle to handle this technology. Robo-sellers
are unlikely to be good candidates for per se prohibition. Instead, a rule of reason approach would seem more appropriate.
However, the application of the rule of reason to robo-sellers
will likely be difficult, and prone to error. Alternatively, imputing robo-sellers’ actions to the humans that program or deploy
them might work in some cases, but would likely lead to highly
unpredictable results given existing antitrust tests. Additionally, the possibility of attributing agency to robo-sellers and handling them directly might hold promise, though the deontological reasoning generally used to justify recognition of robotic
agency would be initially difficult to square with antitrust’s existing instrumental justifications. Finally, an evolving process
of norm creation by the FTC, in tandem with its program of
privacy-related enforcement, may be the best, if yet imperfect,
current choice.
A. THE EFFICIENCY OF ROBO-SELLERS
The deployment of mass-data collection, algorithmic pricing, and automated decisionmaking makes sense for several
business reasons not directly related to the possibility of anticompetitive harm. Employing robo-sellers promises a reduction
of headcount in departments such as sales, accounting, and
marketing. Robo-sellers can labor twenty-four hours, seven
days a week without breaks—and can do so at a very high work
rate. As the trade press describes them:
In the old days, actual humans were dedicated to the task of following
the competition. They scanned newspapers, advertising, investment
reports, and journals, gleaning information wherever they could find
it, never sure if there was high-value information that they had
missed. Now that the process to gather competitive intelligence has
been loaded into software, comprehensive data collection occurs in real-time, and is presented on an easy-to-use dashboard. You can now
dedicate 100% of your time to analyzing the data, rather than collect166
ing it.
166. Kalie Moore, Harness the Power of Human Intelligence: Where Data
and Strategy Meet, RIVALFOX BLOG (Feb. 21, 2014), https://rivalfox.com/blog/
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Understandably, this description may contain a degree of
puffery. Realistically, however, in synergy with roles that are
not automated, mass data collection and algorithmic processing
promises to assist managers in making more, faster, and better
decisions. Where the decisionmaking is also automated, robo167
sellers promise still more cost savings.
As a result, prohibition of robo-sellers appears unwise;
something akin to a per se rule against them would be a poor
fit. Fortunately, antitrust has longstanding alternatives to
168
blanket prohibition, chief among them the rule of reason. As
169
an approach, it is far from perfect, and involves quite a bit of
170
Nonetheless, courts
uncertainty for antitrust defendants.
have more than a century of experience in ascertaining “wheth171
er [a] restraint . . . promotes competition.” If the answer is
“yes,” in practice, courts ask whether the restraint could be
achieved with a less restrictive means; if the answer is “no”
172
then the restraint is redeemed.
At first glance, the rule of reason might seem useful in
dealing with potential harmful effects of robo-selling. As discussed in the prior sections, automated pricing via algorithmic
processing of collected mass data may tend to lead pricing
above the competitive level, either via tacit collusion or more
robust cartel formation. However, the significant labor cost savings and better competitive intelligence that robo-selling promises may partially or completely offset the potential for competitive harm. In more technical terms, the possibility that
producers who adopt robo-selling may see their marginal cost
harness-the-power-of-human-intelligence-where-data-and-strategy-meet.
167. Dana Mattioli, Holiday Price War Rages in Real Time, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24–25, 2012, at A1 (“[T]he rise of e-commerce, along with an explosion in
data and the power of technology for analyzing it, has made it possible for retailers of all stripes to monitor their rivals’ pricing strategies and react in seconds, sometimes with computer algorithms making the decisions.”); see also
Moore, supra note 166.
168. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918).
169. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of
Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1377–87 (2009) (analyzing deficiencies of the
rule of reason against “rule-of-law ideals”).
170. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239 (introducing the rule of reason);
DANIEL A. CRANE, ANTITRUST 52 (2014) (observing that “[a]t its core, the rule
of reason asks whether, on balance, the restraint is good or bad for competition” and “[a]t its worst, the rule of reason feels like a completely amorphous
and unstructured inquiry into all the motivations behind the restraint and its
alternative and economic effects”); see also Stucke, supra note 169, at 1377–78.
171. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
172. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 1505.
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drop may outweigh the incremental risk of deadweight loss due
to increased supracompetitive pricing. Consider, for example,
the discussion of Uber in the introduction of this Article. The
Uber platform lowers transaction costs between drivers and
riders, making possible mutually beneficial exchanges that enhance social welfare. At the same time, the platform coordinates pricing between competing drivers, raising at least the
theoretical risk of price manipulation that harms consumers.
The rule of reason traditionally aims to try to gauge such countervailing positive and negative effects on competition.
Despite more than a century of experience, rule of reason
case law is not a perfect fit for the robo-seller. Firms are already employing automated pricing via algorithmic data processing—but they appear to be doing so individually, not as
173
part of an explicit or tacit agreement with competitors. However, though the rule of reason originated in a Section 2 mo174
nopolization case, courts have not specified how rule of reason
in monopolization cases should apply so as to balance the anti175
and procompetitive effects of a single firm’s conduct. Instead,
the standard approach to single firm conduct asks first whether
176
that conduct is “exclusionary” or “predatory”; conduct should
be condemned only if it can only be profitable by injuring com177
petition and lacks any other legitimate business justification.
It is doubtful whether the employment of a robo-seller could ever be deemed lacking a legitimate business justification, given
the tremendous cost savings possible from sales and marketing
staff reductions, plus the improved speed and accuracy of com178
petitive intelligence gathering.
In fact, most recent Supreme Court discussion of the rule
of reason occurs in cases dealing with agreements among com173. See infra Section II.
174. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
175. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 277 § 6.4 (noting that “[t]he meaning and scope of the rule in monopolization cases are nevertheless
ambiguous”).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir.
2001); see also David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs
and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1217
(2005) (describing Microsoft as applying the standard categorical approach in
Section 2 cases).
177. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (observing that defendant’s conduct in Aspen involved forgoing a normally profitable course of business); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985) (applying profit-sacrifice test).
178. Moore, supra note 166.
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179

petitors—that is to say Section 1 violations. In cases involving concerted action, antitrust courts have long taken a relatively wide view of circumstances surrounding a restraint to
decide whether its precompetitive benefits outweigh its anti180
competitive harm. While early statements of the scope of the
181
inquiry were perhaps overbroad, the rule of reason in Section
1 cases now tends to focus on the likely anticompetitive effects
of a restraint adopted by competitors, whether they have the
market power to make a difference, possible offsetting
procompetitive justifications, and finally, whether there are
182
less restrictive alternatives. For a couple of reasons, the roboseller’s mixed implications for competition will make the rule of
reason complex to apply, thus tending to create uncertainty.
First, similarly to the Section 2 context, the adoption of roboseller technology would seem to come with a built-in
procompetitive justification: reduced cost and more accurate
competitive intelligence. Thus, virtually all applications of the
rule of reason to robo-selling will involve a difficult problem of
balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects. Second, unless
adopted as part of an agreement among competitors—including
via a standard-setting or trade association—Section 1 as currently interpreted would not consider the use of robo-seller
technology to be the adoption of a restraint by competitors.
Thus, while the rule of reason aims specifically at considering balancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of
a restraint, it is not well suited to dealing with the potential
harms of the growth of automated pricing by algorithmic processing of mass-collected data. In the Section 2, single-firm context, the built-in legitimate business justification will tend to
179. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 274.
180. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979) (observing that the restraint at issue was not illegal “where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all” and that the benefit
therefore outweighs the harm); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 54–56 (1977) (balancing a restraint’s harm to competition among
intra-network dealers against the benefit to competition among inter-network
dealers).
181. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239–41 (1918)
(adopting a rule of reasonableness to the application of the Sherman Act); see
also HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 725 § 5.6b (describing Justice Brandeis’
statement of the rule of reason in Chi. Bd. of Trade as “one of the most damaging in the annals of antitrust”).
182. See California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 781
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (limiting the contemporary judicial approach to
the rule of reason).
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exculpate even harmful robo-selling; Section 1 may be inappropriate since multi-firm conduct is not necessarily required to
adopt anticompetitive incidences of robo-selling.
B. AN AGENCY LAW SOLUTION?
In dealing with a robo-seller that takes anticompetitive actions there are three choices in attributing responsibility: to the
183
robo-seller itself, to the humans who deploy it, or to no one.
The choice really comes down to the first two options, as choosing the third option—no liability—would essentially provide
immunity to anticompetitive conduct and results achieved
through automation. Such a choice of inaction does not accord
with competition law based on efficiency and the error-cost
framework; the decision to do nothing would clash starkly with
the current logic and assumptions on which contemporary antitrust law has been tailored and justified.
The choice between attributing responsibility to the roboseller, the humans deploying it, or both, is not an easy one.
Consider the choice of the robo-seller. First, to attribute anticompetitive acts and impact to robo-sellers does not accord well
with existing concepts of agency. The Restatement (Third) of
Agency—already a decade old—states that
[a]t present, computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons
who use them. If a program malfunctions, even in ways unanticipated
by its designer or user, the legal consequences for the person who uses it are no different than the consequences stemming from the malfunction of any other type of instrumentality. That a program may
malfunction does not create capacity to act as a principal or an
184
agent.

Not too long ago, the view that computers must be seen as
185
mere tools may have seemed uncontestable. And indeed, a
move away from this proposition would probably require
186
changes to multiple statutes governing electronic contracting.
183. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 32, at 175 for a similar set of choices.
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. E, illus. 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 2006) (concluding that “a computer program is not capable of acting as a
principal or an agent as defined by the common law”).
185. See, e.g., Joseph Sommer, Against CyberLaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1145, 1177–78 (2000) (stating that “[a] programmed machine is not a juridical
person and therefore cannot be an agent” and that it “cannot appear to be a
principal, thereby triggering the law of undisclosed principals: it is clearly a
machine”).
186. For the point that a computer is incapable of being an agent, the term
“electronic agent” appears in some statutes as a defined term. The Uniform
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At any rate, the law’s current stance that computer programs
are simply tools of their operators creates tension with antitrust law. Such a view implies that the acts done by robosellers can be directly attributed to their human operators. But
as noted in Section III.A, as a matter of current practice, antitrust law uses intent or proxies for it to interpret allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Thus antitrust’s current approach requires a more in-depth investigation into intent than an agency
law approach that would automatically pin a robo-sellers conduct on its employer as one might in the case of a mere “tool;”
by contrast, no one asks whether a there is a disjunction between the effect of a baseball bat used in an attack and the intent of its wielder.
Electronic Transactions Act, § 2(6) 7A U.L.A. (1999) (UETA) defines “electronic agent” as “a computer program or an electronic or other automated means
used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.”
With one addition, “electronic agent” is defined identically in the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001
(2000). The federal definition concludes with the words “at the time of the action or response.” 15 U.S.C. § 7006(3) (2000). Both statutes also treat “person”
as a defined term and do not include electronic agents in a list of persons. The
comment to Section 2 of the UETA is informative, stating that the definition of
electronic agent establishes that it is “a machine. As the term ‘electronic agent’
has come to be recognized it is limited to a tool function.” The comment further
explains that an electronic agent is the tool of the person who uses it and,
[a]s a general rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results
obtained by the use of that tool since the tool has no independent volition of its own. However, an electronic agent, by definition, is capable
within the parameters of its programming, of initiating, responding or
interacting with other parties or their electronic agents once it has
been activated by a party, without further attention of that party.
Section 7, the fundamental premise of the UETA, provides that the
legal significance of a record, signature, or contract is not affected by
the medium in which it was created. Section 9(a) attributes an electronic record or signature to a person if it was the act of the person.
It further provides that “[t]he act of the person may be shown in any manner,
including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” Under subsection 9(b), the effect of an electronic record or signature attributed to a person “is determined from the context and surrounding
circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the
parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.” Comment 5 to
Section 9 states that the section applies to determine the effect of a “clickthrough” transaction. A click-through, if executed with intention to sign, constitutes an electronic signature. While the UETA acknowledges that a person's
actions include those taken by human agents, Section 9 “does not alter existing rules of law regarding attribution.” UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 9
cmt. 1 7A U.L.A. (1999). On conceptions of legal personality more generally,
see Ngaire Naffine, Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003).
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Moreover, as robo-sellers’ sophistication increases, their
ability to act and price autonomously may make the current
agency law’ approach untenable. In particular, some argue that
greater ability to act autonomously counsels for greater recognition of software agents as actors in their own right. For example, in their book A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial
Agents, Samir Chopra and Lawrence F. White have made a
strong argument that increasingly autonomous agents such as
robo-sellers deserve recognition as actors beyond mere tools.
Unlike U.S. antitrust law—which is relentlessly teleological,
particularly given its focus on consumer welfare—much of
Chopra and White’s argument stems from deontological reason187
ing. Their proposal may be right for antitrust, even if their
conclusion is not driven by consumer welfare or another instrumentalist goal; importing their distinction between autonomous artificial agents, including robo-sellers, and those who
employ them, would be a good step for competition law.
Antitrust law would do well to start formulating a more
nuanced approach towards autonomous agents. The challenges
may soon increase. For example, “agreement technologies,” a
class of software agents, increasingly are able to manage supply chains and contract with either on behalf of the firms that
188
These nascent technologies may eventually
employ them.
surpass robo-sellers by going beyond price and output setting to
negotiating, crafting, and executing contractual commitments
that may enable them cause anticompetitive harm. While it is
too early to know how these technologies will play out, it is
worth appreciating that robo-sellers may well represent a technological beginning rather than a conclusion.
C. REGULATORS VS. ROBO-SELLERS
The deployment of robo-sellers requires several large investments: capital, to be sure, but also time and mindshare—
robo-sellers involve the interweaving of mass data gathering,
interconnectivity, algorithmic processing, machine learning,
and automated decisionmaking. Accordingly, a useful understanding of robo-sellers’ implications for competition will require regulators to grapple with different complex ideas. As a
result, it might be important to ask the following question: Can
187. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 32, at 172–73.
188. See Toni Penya-Alba et al., An Environment to Build and Track AgentBased Business Collaborations, in AGREEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 611–24
(Sascha Ossowski ed., Law Governance & Tech. Ser. Vol. 8, 2013) (ebook).
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regulators correctly answer the competition questions that
robo-selling poses? This is particularly important given the existing gap for Nash equilibrium oligopolistic pricing; this important problem, which will likely grow worse, is not even currently illegal, though it does factor into merger review policy, in
which regulators try to block mergers that will produce industries susceptible to such coordination. And can regulators do so
accurately enough to make their involvement worthwhile?
As discussed, antitrust law as it currently stands will face
significant challenges in dealing with robo-sellers. Despite that,
there are at least a couple of reasons to think antitrust institutions may nonetheless succeed in addressing these new regulatory challenges. First, the FTC already is pursuing regulatory
programs involving privacy, data collection, and price discrimi189
nation. This current regulatory push builds on the agency’s
past experience in dealing with the collection of consumer data
190
and its use by sellers. There is likely a substantial overlap between the knowledge needed to handle inquiries in these areas
and that needed to address the potential anticompetitive impact of robo-sellers. Second, the FTC has substantial capacity
to interact with industry, consumer groups, and other stakeholders to shape legislation and to generate norms to govern
the proper deployment of automated pricing powered by mass
191
data collection and algorithmic processing.
189. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY
ACCOUNTABILITY,
(May
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report
-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [hereinafter
DATA BROKERS] (summarizing information about data brokers and consumer
privacy learned from investigative orders and calling for Congress to legislate
and for data broker industry to adopt several best practices); see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Recommends Congress Require the Data Broker Industry To Be More Transparent and Give Consumers Greater Control
Over Their Personal Information (May 27, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news
-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker
-industry-be-more.
190. For example, the FTC has enforced the Fair Credit Reporting Act
since its enactment in 1970. DATA BROKERS, supra note 189, at i. Additionally,
the FTC has already taken aim at consumer privacy concerns in the era of big
data more generally. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND
POLICYMAKERS, (Mar. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era
-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
191. Indeed, even prior to its May 2014 comprehensive report, the agency
had already advised Congress about the impact on consumers of the data broker industry. See Prepared Statement of the Fed Trade Comm’n on What InAND
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The FTC’s recent experience with the mass collection of
consumer data is important, because regulation of robo-sellers
by standard competition policy approaches may be quite difficult. As discussed in prior sections, conventional antitrust approaches that hinge on intent or on proxies chosen to avoid an
intent inquiry will likely not work well when robo-sellers replace human sales and marketing staff and their paperwork.
A second important problem concerns pricing and measurement. Current antitrust analysis depends crucially on asking whether a seller’s conduct raises prices to consumers above
a competitive level; this is a key question that competition enforcers and their economic advisers ask as they proceed with an
investigation. Typically this is done by comparing the market
price given the conduct at issue with a hypothetical (or preconduct) competitive market price.
However, it is not clear that the individualized and moment-to-moment prices made possible by algorithmic pricing
will be easily amenable to comparing an overall price with a
baseline competitive price. To take a related example in an industry experienced with such pricing, the algorithms used by
the airlines in the twenty-first century change prices based on
supply and demand. They do so with such speed, with such
complex rules, and with so many interactions between them,
that mathematicians have observed that, in fact, finding the
cheapest airfare between two locations is actually unsolvable as
a practical manner, since “it could take the fastest computer
192
longer than the lifetime of the universe to find the solution.”
As a result, trying to do the standard price comparison may be
193
very difficult; this type of measurement problem may grow to
encompass other industries.
formation Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 113th Cong. (Dec. 18, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared
-statement-federal-trade-commission-entitled-what-information-do-data
-brokers-have-consumers/131218databrokerstestimony.pdf.
192. Devlin, supra note 133; see also Robinson, supra note 133.
193. Notably, in the context of the US Airways/American Airlines merger,
the Justice Department’s complaint attempted a unilateral effects analysis,
comparing selected moment-in-time pricing in selected city pairs where the
two airlines competed with those in which they did not. Whether this method
would have been persuasive to a court remains unknown, as the DOJ greenlighted the merger subject to certain multi-year commitments by the merged
airline. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competitive Impact Statement, United
States v. US Airways Grp., NO. 1:13-CV-01236(CKK) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013),
(explaining that settlement is in the public interest under the Tunney Act and
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As a result, the better route to avoiding competitive harm
may be to undertake proactive shaping of industry behavior
through dialogue with stakeholders, targeted regulation, and/or
norm generation. The FTC is comparatively well-placed to do
this job. On a general level, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection has for more than a decade dealt with consumer pri194
vacy issues online. In a string of cases, the FTC has brought
enforcement actions against companies that handled consumer
information in ways that breached prior representations made
initially when gathering that data—for example, by subsequently selling consumer data after having assured consumers
195
that it would not be shared externally. Other FTC consumer
data cases involve promising, yet failing to deliver, state-of-the196
art consumer data protection.

detailing the Department’s asserted remedies for competition concerns).
194. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the
Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 251–52 (2011) (describing and
critiquing FTC’s activity as an online privacy regulator).
195. E.g., News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Settlement
with Bankrupt Website Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Violations,
FTC.GOV (July 21, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/
07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-regarding
(announcing settlement of charges against Toysmart after it violated its policy of
not sharing customer information with third parties); News Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Online Pharmacies Settle FTC Charges (July 12, 2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/online-pharmacies
-settle-ftc-charges (announcing a settlement involving misuse of online pharmacy customer data for purposes other than physician consultation, in violation of company policy); News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Site
Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal Information
in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case (Aug. 13, 1998), https://www.ftc
.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/08/internet-site-agrees-settle-ftc-charges
-deceptively-collecting (settling charges that a website with a two million
member virtual community was mispresenting the purpose for which it gathered consumer data online).
196. E.g., News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guess Settles FTC Security
Charges: Third FTC Case Targets False Claims about Information Security
(June 18, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/guess
-settles-ftc-security-charges-third-ftc-case-targets-false (settling case alleging
that clothing company website claimed personal information including credit
card data was encrypted though it was not and was left vulnerable to hackers);
News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging
False Security and Privacy Promises (Aug. 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news
-events/press-releases/2002/08/microsoft-settles-ftc-charges-alleging-false
-security-privacy (setting charges that Microsoft falsely claimed that it used
appropriate security measures to protect consumer data entrusted to its
“Passport” service, which would remember consumer sign-in and other information across different websites).
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The FTC’s experience with consumer privacy and with data
brokers, as well its engagement in dialogue with Congress, consumers, and industry on related issues, makes it a comparatively strong choice for dealing with robo-sellers. Because robosellers require massive collection of sales data, their operation
implicates actions and issues that overlap with data collection
by online retailers and data brokers. Data brokers themselves
already parse that data algorithmically to divvy up markets into narrower segments for sellers to target, with shorthand
names such as “green consumer” or, perhaps involving ethnic
197
or racial targeting, “Urban Scramble.” The FTC as a regulator is already addressing the possibility that such practices
198
may lead to potentially harmful forms of price discrimination,
and Congress is already considering legislation in the form of a
199
that
“Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act”
would further empower the FTC to deal with these issues.
Steps beyond new regulation may be required. The FTC is
already engaged in dialogue with leading data brokers such as
Acxiom, Corelogic, and Datalogix that deal in data involving
hundreds of millions of customers, combining both online and
200
offline information. Discussions of best practices may help
address feared harm from robo-sellers before it actually occurs.
In addition, the FTC may need to develop new, independent
competencies. For example, the private sector already uses “al-

197. DATA BROKERS, supra note 189, at iv–v, 20, 47 (raising the issue of
market segmentation and labelling possibly being a form of racial profiling).
198. See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU 196 (2011) (describing use of consumer data for price discrimination purposes); Jeff Gelles, Time to Rein in the
Data-Broker Industry, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jun. 2, 2014), http://articles.philly
.com/2014-06-02/business/50248175_1_data-brokers-data-broker-industry
-rapleaf (warning of possibility of data-driven price discrimination).
199. STAFF OF S., 113TH CONG., WORKING DRAFT OF BILL ON THE DATA
BROKER ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ACT (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/13d141a3-76b8-4191-810b
-ebbfd5125759/764C58973E7D889E72B470ECEDA988D9.data-broker
-accountability-and-transparency-act.pdf; Meena Harris, Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act Introduced By Senate Democrats,
INSIDEPRIVACY (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/
congress/data-broker-accountability-and-transparency-act-introduced-by
-senate-democrats.
200. The FTC recently created an Office of Technology, Research and Investigation, whose aim is at least in part to investigate the effects of algorithms on markets. The Department of Justice also recently prosecuted its
first criminal case involving the use of algorithmic software to fix prices. See
Jill Priluck, When Bots Collude, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www
.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude.
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gorithmic enforcement” to press its rights in high-tech fields.
The FTC may need to employ such techniques in order to detect
the anticompetitive use of robo-selling.
Proactive regulation by the FTC will likely not be a panacea. Nonetheless, it is important to avoid making the perfect
the enemy of the good in an area undergoing such rapid and
uncertain change. Significant resource asymmetries between
business and government may drive doubt about the utility of
regulation. Competition for profit incentivizes business to invest and innovate in its use of technology proactively; government regulators, not similarly impelled by market forces, tend
to adapt in a more reactive manner, subject to political con202
straints. Nonetheless, cooperatively generating norms and
best practices for firms employing robo-sellers may be a good
start that also benefits from synergies with the FTC’s preexisting regulatory initiatives.
***
As this Section has discussed, key systemic issues will
complicate how current antitrust law handles the robo-seller.
In sum, two key issues dominate. First, it is possible to underestimate the benefits of the robo-seller. Even if, as this Article
has discussed, tacit collusion becomes more likely with robosellers, they may nonetheless be so efficient that their benefits
outweigh their harms. In more formal terms, using algorithms,
software, and big data to do key business functions such as
market intelligence, information gathering, strategic management, and sales may reduce marginal cost even while they
make tacit collusion and pricing to consumers above marginal
cost more likely; the problem becomes a question of weighing
203
the expected value of positive and negative effects. Second, a
question that is difficult to answer under current knowledge is
whether robo-sellers can be successfully regulated. Robo-sellers’
poor fit with existing antitrust doctrines, the complexity of the
algorithms involved and their interaction makes this potential201. See Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing:
Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1483, 1498 (2014) (describing “algorithmic enforcement” of IP rights).
202. See DANIEL INNERARITY, THE DEMOCRACY OF KNOWLEDGE 176 (2013)
(“The government would only pay attention to innovation in a reactive manner, adapting legislation to new technological circumstances . . . .”).
203. There are conflicting viewpoints on how to treat such a circumstance.
Some commentators view any welfare transfer from consumers to producers as
in conflict with antitrust law’s original intent and continuing goal, regardless
of any offsetting overall social welfare benefits. See Lande, supra note 31.
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ly a daunting regulatory challenge. Nonetheless, there appears
to be potential synergies between the FTC’s exiting regulatory
program for consumer privacy and a potential initiative to address robo-sellers.
CONCLUSION: FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY TO
SOLUTION?
After almost 125 years of the Sherman Act, the nature of
concerted action and the definition of price fixing remain contested. This is unfortunate, since how concerted action is defined is a critical question for courts to decide when oligopoly
behavior crosses the line into price fixing—and deserves the
treble damages and criminal penalties that such cartel behavior entails. The advent of autonomous pricing via algorithmic
processing of mass sales data can turn this doctrinal antitrust
crisis into an opportunity for reexamination.
In fact, antitrust is not the only area that will require adaptation. Consider an analogy to the autonomous cars developed by Google and several major automakers. As mentioned,
there exists a current debate over whether the algorithms in
these vehicles should choose to save a single occupant even if
that requires killing several others; this is a variant on the fa204
205
mous “trolley problem” in moral philosophy. At issue is
whether algorithms should be designed to do things that are
individually rational yet socially harmful. While that is a difficult question to answer, because it implicates ethics, policy, and
law, it should be handled not merely behind closed doors by
coders working for private firms, but through more open interplay between various stakeholders, including firms, consumers,
and regulators. Similar logic should apply to robo-sellers to
avoid results that, while profitable for individual firms, are
harmful to consumer welfare overall.
As discussed, the problems with applying current antitrust
enforcement techniques to the new challenge of robo-sellers
suggest that a new regulatory dialogue is required. Fortunately, the FTC’s existing regulatory program provides a platform
on which to locate that dialogue. If fruitful, that dialogue may

204. See Limer, supra note 41.
205. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the
Double Effect, OXFORD REV., no. 5, 1967, at 3–4.
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serve to help shore up an existing fault line in antitrust doctrine and theory.

